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History, despite its wrenching pain,
Cannot be unlived, but if faced
With courage, need not be lived again.
Maya Angelou
excerpted from,
On the Pulse of Morning
I. A TYPICAL DAY
Everyday in Florida children are placed in foster care because of sus-
pected abuse or neglect at the hands of their parents. The intent is to protect,
nurture, and restore these children, while either helping their families become
healthy and safe for reunification or, where that is not possible or safe,
placing the children with new permanent families. However, on any given
day the very system intended to protect these children will neglect or abuse
many of them, emotionally and physically. On any given day, Florida's
foster children will have the following types of experiences: 1) A child will
go to bed curled up in anguish because yet another day went by, more than
thirty now, in which he has not seen his mother. A court-approved case plan,
written by the Department of Children and Families ("DCF' or "Depart-
ment"), dictates that mom be at work during all of the hours that supervised
visitation is offered. For the same reason, another foster child hardly knows
her mom and dad because she has seen them only a handful of times in the
last three years. Knowing this, today her parents will give up and surrender
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their parental rights without a trial; 2) A child will awake in foster care, very
excited, anxiously expecting the arrival of her mother. She has counted the
days. She may go to bed tonight weeping. Her DCF case worker will never
arrive to supervise visitation; 3) A child's health and progress in the Depart-
ment's care will be reviewed in court. The review will consist of about forty
seconds of testimony from two witnesses. Coordinating calendars for the
next review will take four minutes. The lawyers, guardian ad litem, parents,
and caseworker will spend forty minutes waiting for the hearing to begin; 4)
A two-year-old child will have spent five months with strangers in state care.
No one has started the process of providing her father with constitutionally
required legal notice of the case. As of today, neither the DCF nor its attor-
neys have asked anyone where her father is. They have not even asked for
his name. Today, the Department, through its attorney, will ask for and
receive from the court permission to take another sixty days to give him
notice, for a total of seven months, even though the law requires this process
to be completed in the first twenty-eight days of the case; 5) If she could
understand, a child would see her mother offered a case plan for rehabilita-
tive services today, five months after the infant was taken from her mother.
By law, these services should have been offered no later than sixty days after
the Department took the baby; 6) A nine-year-old child will conclude her
ninth month without seeing or speaking to her mother. A DCF case worker
felt that the mother's alcoholism recovery was not advanced enough to allow
any contact. Today, a judge will find out for the first time that the case
worker has violated state law which requires court approval to block visita-
tion; 7) A child's mother will still not have met her attorney, even though the
attorney was appointed by the court four months ago; 8) A child will awake
in foster care, having been taken from his parents several months ago be-
cause of bruising. Today, the DCF will admit in court that they have "no
basis to prove the source of the bruising;" 9) A child's mother will be in
violation of her case plan because she lacks transportation to reach the
services required in the plan, a fact known when the case plan was written
and approved by the court; 10) A child's volunteer guardian ad litem will not
appear for a statutorily-required shelter review to report on the child's condi-
tion and progress of the child's welfare; 11) An infant child will spend his
fifth month in State care away from his mother, recovering from an injury
alleged to have been caused by abuse at her hands. Today, the DCF's attor-
ney will brag in the mother's presence that she is going to terminate the
mother-son relationship at trial because of the alleged abuse. Tomorrow, for
the first time, that attorney will obtain the child's medical records from
before he was taken from his mon, records which may vindicate her; 12) A
child's protective care will almost be ended when a DCF attorney, with the
child's caseworker sitting silently at her side, assures a judge the case can be
dismissed. The Department, she says, is satisfied the child can be safely
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returned to her mother. The mother's attorney will sit idly by. The child's
guardian ad litem will not attend the hearing, sending an unknowledgeable
sit-in. A cautious judge will ask probing questions of the case worker, only
to learn that the child's mother not only failed to complete required counsel-
ing and evaluation, but expressly refused to do so. The Department's attor-
ney did not know. She did not speak with the caseworker before the court
hearing; 13) A judge will order that a child's best interests be overseen by the
Guardian Ad Litem Program. The child may not have an actual volunteer
guardian for months. Today, the program is assigned to over 1000 cases, for
which it does not have volunteers to serve as guardians, in just one judicial
circuit; and 14) A brother and sister will be escorted from the home of foster
parents they lived with for two and a half years. The foster parents had
intended to adopt them. The adoption fell through because the foster parents
could no longer stand the agony and uncertainty of waiting for the system to
terminate the birth parents' rights to clear the case for adoption, and the
children had become unmanageable, acting out on their frustrations with an
uncertain future. The most recent continuance of the termination trial was
for ten months. Given the advancing age of the children and their current
disposition, child welfare professionals will comment that the children will
likely be separated from each other if even one of them is lucky enough to be
adopted.
These are real cases from a typical day in August 2000.1 These types of
things, and perhaps worse, will likely happen again today all over Florida to
1. The cases were observed by or reported to the author on August 7, 2000, or
August 18, 2000, in the Broward County Courthouse, Florida's 17th Judicial Circuit (notes on
file with author). Various child welfare professionals, including guardians ad litem, attorneys,
and judicial officers confirmed on those dates that the cases and circumstances were typi-
cal. Interviews with child welfare professionals experienced in other Florida judicial circuits
confirmed that the observations in the Seventeenth Circuit are relatively typical of other
judicial circuits. Interview with Jeanette Wagner, Circuit Director, Seventeenth Judicial
Circuit Guardian Ad Litem Program in Ft. Lauderdale, Fla. (Aug. 7 & 18, 2000); Confidential
Interview with child welfare professional, private sector service provider (May 23, 2000);
Interview with Howard M. Talenfeld, child attorney/class action attorney (Sept. 14, 2000);
Interview with Ann C. Jones, Staff Attorney, Sixth Judicial Circuit in Orlando, Fla. (Aug. 30,
2000); Interview with Russell Querry, Staff Attorney, Sixth Judicial Circuit in Orlando, Fla.
(Aug. 30, 2000); Confidential Interview with child welfare professional, public sector supervi-
sory employee, in West Palm Beach, Fla. (Oct. 17, 2000); Telephone Interview with Victoria
A. Vilchez, birth parent attorney, in West Palm Beach, Fla. (Aug. 25, 2000); Interview with
Karen Gievers, child attorney/class action attorney, in Tallahassee, Fla. (June 26, 2000);
Fourth Annual Dependency Court Improvement Summit, Aug. 30-Sept. 1, 2000, Orlando,
Fla., pertinent public comments from a variety of child welfare professionals statewide were
obtained at the DCF District 10 breakout sessions; Innovations in Dependency Practice
workshop; Lawyers in the Courtroom workshop; and Case Conferencing workshop) (notes of
summit and all interviews on file with author).
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children who the state is supposed to be protecting, nurturing, and restoring.
These types of things, and worse, have been happening to Florida's foster
children for decades, and Florida's children are not alone.2
Despite typical days like these, the DCF, the agency principally respon-
sible for the welfare of Florida's dependent children, proclaims on its Inter-
net site on the same typical day in August 2000 that some ninety-eight
percent of the children receiving Department services are safe from abuse or
neglect.3 Were the observed cases simply among the remaining two percent?
Apparently not. Ample evidence indicates that far more than two percent of
foster children are not safe from, at the very least, passive abuse or neglect
by the dependency system of their basic needs and their interest in reunifica-
tion with their families, or in achieving other permanent family arrange-
ments. These problems are so endemic to the system that the child welfare
community recognizes them with widely used terms, like "foster care drift"
and "program abuse." For foster children, all too often the problems are
viewed simply as a way of life.4 The problems are simply not defined offi-
cially as rendering children "unsafe," but they should be.
II. A STUDY OF FLORIDA'S DEPENDENCY SYSTEM
This article reports the findings of a study of Florida's child welfare and
dependency system. The recommendations which follow propose legislative
action to ensure that foster children in all cases can be expected to achieve
the permanent and stable family placements that they need to thrive, and to
ensure that dependency proceedings resolve as quickly as possible. These
are not new or novel goals. These are long-held, existing goals of child
welfare law which, this study finds, escape fruition in far too many cases.
Tragically, child after child still spends excruciatingly long periods of time in
foster care to the detriment of their safety and health--on average, over three
years. Many children spend five, six, or even seven years of their childhood
2. Jill Chaifetz, Listening to Foster Children in Accordance with the Law: The
Failure to Serve Children in State Care, 25 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 1, 6 (1999),
noting, inter alia, recognition within the child welfare community of the term, "program
abuse," to describe the failure of foster care systems to provide stable homes and needed
services for foster children. Also noted is the fact that by 1995, the foster care system in 22
states and the District of Columbia were under some form of court supervision for inadequate
or inappropriate care of foster children. Id. at 8.
3. FLA. DEP'T OF CHILDREN & FAMIuES, AUGUST 2000 SrrUATION REPORT M0077,
available at http:llwww.state.fl.uslcfweb/newslsptlsitr/0800.html. Of note, approximately
the same statewide average is reported for children being safe from abuse and neglect while
their families are receiving in-home services. Id. at FSP-017.
4. Confidential Interview with attorney for dependent children in Broward County,
Fla. (July 26, 2000) (notes on file with author).
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in foster care, leaving them day after typical day with uncertain futures,
depriving many of them of nurturing childhoods. The children may survive
physically, but far too many reach adulthood damaged, scarred, and weak.
To understand why our legislative and social goals for child welfare are
not met in so many cases, this study examines extensive statistical and
anecdotal evidence of a consensus in Florida's child welfare community that
many foster children suffer from protracted uncertainty for their future in
lengthy dependency proceedings, leaving them at risk of significant psycho-
logical damage. The study also looks across the nation and at the history of
child welfare law and public policy to understand why, despite decades of
efforts and better intentions, the dependency systems in Florida and else-
where seem impervious to federal and state government efforts and mandates
to expedite cases to ensure the safety and stability of children. Principally,
the study concludes that the statutory assignment of responsibilities in the
system itself fundamentally and adversely prevent efficacy on a case-by-case
basis. This conclusion may well be contrary to the belief of many readers
that the primary culprits are inadequate funding, failures of child welfare
officials within the Department, or insufficient action by the judiciary. These
matters will be explored, but placed in perspective.
The proposed solutions keep in mind two practical constraints of public
policy. First, not all problems are best redressed by legislative action. Statu-
tory reform will not always help when a problem arises and greater funding
appropriations are not always needed simply because a problem exists.
Second, problems of public policy typically take time to redress, often more
time than is comfortable. Efforts to redress problems which are underway
need to be considered, evaluated and given a respectful opportunity to suc-
ceed. Finally, the problems identified in this study are not all which are
present in Florida's dependency system, but are limited to those which call
into question the effectiveness of child welfare policy imposed statewide by
statute.
5
5. Other studies have concluded that child welfare system problems require the
concerted efforts of the several participating groups, including a variety of non-legislative
efforts. Donald N. Duquette et al., We Know Better Than We Do: A Policy Framework for
Child Welfare Reform, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 93 (1997).
Our central message is that child welfare reform must be broad-based and in-
terdisciplinary. No single group and no single element of a system or a
community-social agencies, family advocacy groups, the courts, the state
legislature, or a state administrative agency-has the ability to meaningfully
improve foster care on its own.
Id. at 101. See also Donald N. Duquette et al., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERvs.,
ADOPTION 2002: THE PRESIDEmT's INITIATIVE ON ADOPTION AND FosTER CARE; GuIDEuINEs
FOR PUBLIC POLICY AND STATE LEGISLATION GOVERNING PERMANENCE FOR CHILDREN (June
1999), available at http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/cb/publications/adoptO2/index.htm;
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111. CONCERNING METHODOLOGY AND HUSHED DISCLOSURES
The study was conducted by the author from May to November
2000. Interviews were conducted with over sixty public and private sector
child welfare professionals throughout Florida, though many had experience
in both. Included were attorneys and guardians ad litem for children, as were
birth parent attorneys. Birth parents were interviewed, including one who
had prevailed in litigation brought by the Department and two whose parental
rights were ultimately terminated at trial. Foster parents were interviewed.
Input was received from attorneys for the state at the circuit and statewide
level, and from low and high-level supervisory officials and case-level
workers at the DCF. Child protection investigators were interviewed, as
were supervisory protective investigation officials. Court officials, including
dependency judges, at the statewide and circuit level were also consulted.
Citizens and parents who have made reports to the Child Abuse Hotline
provided their perspectives and experiences. Professionals involved in the
delivery of social services to dependent children and their families of origin
were also interviewed. Some persons were interviewed multiple times as the
study progressed.
Observations were made in visits to dependency court hearings in one
Florida circuit and to Department service centers. Additional information,
perspectives, and first hand accounts of what is and is not working in the
dependency system were obtained over a three-day period at Florida's 2000
Annual Dependency Court Improvement Summit, co-sponsored by the
Department and the Office of the State Courts Administrator and attended by
over 1000 child welfare professionals from across Florida.
Applicable Florida and federal laws were examined, as were statutory
approaches to child welfare in other states. Problems with child welfare
experienced by other states and their reform efforts were also studied through
written materials and interviews. State and federal government reports and
studies of child abuse and neglect and the overall performance of the child
welfare system were reviewed. Data, forms, various planning documents,
and reports obtained from the DCF were examined. Several articles, com-
mentaries, and books on the topic were considered.
In some instances, persons interviewed for this study asked not to be
identified in any oral or written findings. Maintaining these confidences
does not compromise the value of the information and perspectives received
for two reasons. One, it appeared in each instance that confidentiality pro-
vided the reporter desired safety to discuss candidly facts and impressions
from extensive experience in the dependency system. There was no sugges-
BErn A. BARRETr ET AL, HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY INFANT AND TODDLER STUDY 25-27 (Aug.
2000), available at http://www.childrensboard.orglanalysisreports.html.
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tion of malice. Two, information and perspectives provided in confidence
proved to be consistent with the statistical data relied upon in this study, and
anecdotal information and impressions tended to repeat themselves among
reporters in varied parts of the state and of varied levels of authority. It is left
to the reader to assess any significance of so many child welfare profession-
als requesting anonymity in this report. This study draws no conclusions
from this fact.
IV. A NOTE ON DATA
While federal law requires that states, like Florida, which receive fed-
eral funding for their foster care system, maintain an information system
which tracks, among other things, placement goals for all children in foster
care,6 Florida is apparently having problems with the reliability of its
data. Even basic data currently maintained and reported by the DCF, such as
the number of children in foster care, can be significantly unreliable, though
efforts are underway to solve this problem. 7 For example, recently, children
in one DCF District were reportedly uncounted by as much as 1000, depriv-
ing the system of funding opportunities. 8 DCF reports reviewed for this
study also revealed disparities in baseline performance measures and statis-
tics. For example, the DCF Agency Strategic Plan for fiscal year 2000-2001
reports that in fiscal year 1997-1998, the rate of child protective investiga-
tions were 37.2 per 1000 children.9 The DCF Agency Strategic Plan for
fiscal years 1999-2000/2003-2004, issued earlier, indicates that the rate was
36.2 per 1000 children. 10 Similarly confusing is Department data reflecting
that ninety-five percent of children who exited foster care over the past two
years did not re-enter within twelve months, while data collected by the
6. 42 U.S.C. § 622(b)(9)(B) (1994).
7. Interview with Peggy Sanford, Assistant General Counsel, Fla. Dep't of Children
& Families and Mary C. Allegretti, Chief, Child Protection Policy, Fla. Dep't of Children &
Families, in Tallahassee (June 27, 2000).
8. Jacqueline Charles, Foster Kids Often Lost in Shuffle, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 3,
2000, at 7B.
9. FiA. DEP'T OF CHILDREN & FAMIEs, FY 2000-2001 AGENCY STRATEGIC PLAN
(PROGRAM Focus) 2 (Feb. 2000), available at http://www.myflorida.con/cf web/myflorida/
healthfamily/publications/bureaus/dcf/pubs.html.
10. FLA. DEP'T OF CHnDREN & FAmmS, AGENCY STRATEGIC PLAN, FY 1999-2000/
2003-2004 10, available at http:llwww.myflorida.comlcf_ web/myfloridalhealthfaniily/
publications/bureaus/dcf/pubs.html.
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federal government reports that this was the case with only eighty-seven
percent of Florida's cases.11
V. PART I-CHILD WELFARE LAWS-AN EFFORT TO ENSURE THE BEST
INTERESTS OF CHILDREN
A. Legal Tender-The Influence of Federal Money
State government intervention in cases of child abuse, neglect, and
abandonment began in the late 1800s, when state governments joined private
charitable and religious organizations for the first time in their efforts to
protect and care for children. By the 1950s, all states had agencies to redress
child abuse, neglect, and abandonment. Federal involvement began in 1935
with the expansion of the Social Security Act to include a child welfare
services program. Notwithstanding a relatively minimal financial commit-
ment up to the 1970s, totaling approximately $200 million annually by the
close of that decade, the last two decades have seen explosive growth in the
federal commitment to approximately $4.5 billion in 2000.12 With that
growth, the influence of federal policies on state child welfare laws and
practices has become very significant.
Under Title IV-E of the Social Security Act, federal funding is to pro-
vide for "foster care and transitional independent living programs" for ap-
propriate foster children, as well as assistance and incentives for adoption of
special needs children. 13 To be eligible for any federal funding, a state must
submit a child welfare services plan (the "state plan") to the United States
Department of Health and Human Services, which has been jointly devel-
oped by the state agency and the federal Department's Secretary.14 The state
plan must meet several requirements, including that the applying agency
"administers or supervises" the state's child welfare services and various
other matters demonstrating compliance with the substantive and procedural
requirements discussed here.15
11. U.S. DEs"T OF HEA.TH AND HUMAN SExvs. CniLDREN's BUREAU, CHm WELFARE
OUTcOMES 1998: ANNUAL REPORT 3-2-3, 5-59 (1998), available at http://www.acf.dhhs.govl
programs/cb/ publications/index.htm.
12. Howard Davidson, Child Protection Policy and Practice at Century's End, 33
FAM. L. Q. 765, 766-67 (1999).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 670 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 622(a) (1994). "Child welfare services" includes those related to
dependent or neglected children. See § 625(a)(1). Regarding case plans, see generally
§§ 670-79.
15. § 622(b)(1).
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Substantively, federal influence begins with the primary guiding princi-
ple of child welfare law. In accord, the health and safety of children are to be
the paramount concerns in dependency cases under Florida law, while pro-
viding that state intervention into families is to be "constructive," "nonadver-
sarial," and respectful of "the integrity of families."16 Receipt of federal
funding is contingent on states pursuing reunification of families where "safe
and appropriate;" alternatively, children are to be placed for adoption or
"other planned, permanent living arrangement.' 7
With the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980
("AACWA"), the federal government sought to better ensure that children
are only removed from their families of origin if "reasonable efforts" are
made to prevent the need for removal and, likewise, that permanent termina-
tion of parental rights only follows efforts to create a safe environment for
the children to return home. This effort was inspired in part by a concern
that states were overusing foster care, both as an intervention method and as
the ultimate solution to familial problems. Concerns that AACWA's provi-
sions were promoting protracted and futile efforts at reunification to the
detriment of foster children, and that reunification efforts were being made in
cases of aggravating circumstances which warranted immediate termination
of parental rights, contributed to the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997
("ASFA"), which further amended the Social Security Act.'8
This act is credited with fundamentally changing the national approach
to foster care, in particular targeting the problem of how long children stay in
foster care.19 The legislation recognized that a better balance was needed
between efforts to ensure a child's safety, employing reasonable efforts to
preserve a child's family of origin while achieving permanency for a child in
each case. The goal was to address the problem of children languishing in
foster care while protracted efforts were made to reunify their families of
origin.2° In accord with federal funding eligibility requirements, Florida law
indicates that the child welfare system is supposed "[t]o preserve and
strengthen ... family ties whenever possible"21  Children should only be
removed from their homes and remain in shelter care if "the department has
made reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the need for removal .... ,22
16. FLA. STAT. § 39.001(1)(b)2, (e) (2000); see also 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(A) (Supp.
IV 1998).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 622(b)(9)(B)(iii) (1994).
18. See Chaifetz, supra note 2, at 4-5; Davidson, supra note 12, at 770-73.
19. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FOSTER CARE: STATES EARLY EXPERIENCES
IMPLEMENTING THE ADOPTION AND SAFE FAMILES ACT I, 3-4 (Dec. 1999), available at
http:llwww.gao.gov/new.items/heOOOOl.pdf; see also Davidson, supra note 12, at 772.
20. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 19, at 1, 4.
21. FLA. STAT. § 39.001(1)(f) (2000).
22. § 39.402(10).
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Reasonable efforts are not to be required if a parent has subjected a
child to an "aggravated circumstance." Such circumstances are to be defined
by state law, but federal law offers as possible examples abandonment,
torture, chronic abuse, and sexual abuse. For example, reasonable efforts are
not to be required where a parent has committed murder or voluntary man-
slaughter of another child of the parent, where a parent has committed a
felony assault resulting in serious bodily injury to the child or another child
of the parent, nor where a parent's parental rights have been involuntarily
terminated as to a sibling of the child at issue. Reasonable efforts to keep
families together are presumed if an emergency exists at the time of the
Department's first contact. Similarly, a presumption arises from a "substan-
tial and immediate danger" to a child's health or safety which preventative
services can not mitigate or, in cases of extreme abuse, where grounds for
expedited termination of parental rights are apparent. Significantly, while
the law prohibits children being removed or kept from their homes pending
disposition if in-home intervention or preventative services would render the
home safe, reasonable efforts are nonetheless presumed if there are no pre-
ventative services available which can ensure the child's health or safety in
the home.24 Thus, the standard will keep a child away from his or her family
and in shelter care if preventative services are simply not available.
Among other things to promote "reasonable efforts" to prevent the need
for removal or termination of parental rights, federal law requires a tailored
case Blan for each child aimed at achieving permanent, safe place-
ment. Federal law permits so-called "concurrent planning," that is, that
reasonable efforts to reunify a family may be made at the same time that
efforts are being made to place the child for adoption, a practice that Florida
has adopted.2 Florida law seeks to implement these conditions, requiring
that unless a statutory exception for expedited termination of parental rights
exists, the Department must demonstrate that it has made "reasonable efforts
to reunify" a family where a child is in out-of-home care. Significantly, this
includes "the exercise of reasonable diligence and care ... to provide the
services.., delineated in the case plan." 27
Florida law must provide for compliance with federal requirements to
support its heavy reliance on federal funding of the dependency sys-
tem. Almost one-third of Florida's $724 million child welfare budget comes
23. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). Similarly, reunification is
not required for aiding, abetting, attempting, conspiring, or soliciting for such offenses.
§ 671(a)(15)(D)(ii)(III).
24. FLA. STAT. § 39.402(7) (2000).
25. See generally Davidson, supra note 12, at 771; Chaifetz, supra note 2, at 4-5.
26. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B), (F) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); FLA. STAT. § 39.601(3)(a)
(2000).
27. FLA. STAT. § 39.521(1)(01. (2000).
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from two parts of the Social Security Act, twenty-five percent from Title IV-
E and approximately four percent from Title IV-B.28 Title IV-E provides for
partial reimbursement of the costs of foster care in return for making reason-
able efforts to prevent removal or termination of parental rights. Title IV-B
of the Social Security Act addresses services to be provided through the
dependency system. Accounting for all sources, a full fifty percent of all
foster care expenditures in Florida are from the federal government. Almost
ten thousand foster children in Florida are relying on Tile IV-E fund-
ing. Title 1V-E funding pays for many costs of foster care, including food,
clothing, shelter, visitation travel expenses, and the like. Similarly, adminis-
trative and operational expenses connected with institutional care are recov-
erable.29
The time it takes for dependency cases to conclude is a significant
federal concern which has been met with specific case goals. Safe, perma-
nent homes for children are supposed to be found more quickly as a result of
ASFAs enactment; cases were supposed to end where children wait eighteen
months or more before adoption or other alternatives to reunification are
pursued.30  ASFA employs several measures to attempt to ensure that its
goals are met, some substantive in nature, others procedural. Types of
extreme abuse cases are identified in which no reunification efforts are
required (though these cases are relatively rare) and in those cases alternative
permanent homes must be sought within thirty days of the determination that
such circumstances apply, provisions which Florida law now contains. 31 In
other cases where reunification might be appropriate, but cannot be accom-
plished in a reasonable amount of time, time frames are set in which proceed-
ings to terminate parental rights are to begin.32 This includes cases where
children have been in foster care for fifteen of the previous twenty-two
months, though Florida has adopted a more restrictive twelve-month stan-
dard.33 Federal law allows exceptions for cases where children are in relative
care or where the state has failed to provide sufficient services for improving
28. The precise percentages are 24.29% for IV-E dollars and 3.81% for IV-B dol-
lars. See Letter from Margaret Taylor, Financial Administrator, Fla. Dep't of Children &
Families (enclosures) (Aug. 29, 2000) (on file with author).
29. Id.
30. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OMCE, supra note 19, at 3-4.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D), (E) (Supp. IV 1998); FLA. STAT. § 39.521(1)(f)
(2000); see also FLA. STAT. § 39.806(l)(e), (2) (2000); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OMCE,
supra note 19, at 1-2, 4. Only between three and ten percent of removal cases are estimated to
meet the reasonable efforts waiver provision. Id. at 9.
32. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFICE, supra note 19, at 1; see also FLA. STAT.
§§ 39.601(3)(k), .703 (2000).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E) (Supp. IV 1998); FLA. STAT. § 39.703(2) (2000); U.S.
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 19, at 4.
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the home of origin such that it is safe for the child to return, standards of
which Florida law takes advantage.
34
ASFA contains a number of other strict substantive and time standards
from the inception of a case to its close which are designed to achieve the
balance between a child's need for permanency and an interest in maintain-
ing familial ties, and which Florida law embodies. With ties to receipt of
federal funding, the standards include: 1) At the first hearing regarding the
removal of a child from his or her home, the court must find that return to the
home is "contrary to [his or her] welfare." Failing this, the case is ineligible
for Title IV-E funding, a failure which cannot be remedied at a later hear-
ing.35 Florida law includes this standard to allow for funding eligibility;36 2)
Within sixty days of a child's actual removal from his or her home, a written
and tailored case plan must be prepared, a requirement also embodied in
current Florida law. In this same time frame, a court must enter a finding
that "reasonable efforts" were made to prevent the child's removal from the
home in the first instance, barring which the case becomes completely ineli-
gible for Title IV-E funding, a standard Florida has actually expanded to
require three such findings in sixty days;38 3) Within twelve months of a
child's entry into foster care,39 and thereafter each twelve months if neces-
sary, federal law requires that the state's child welfare agency make reason-
able efforts to finalize a permanency plan, evidenced by a court finding that
this has occurred. While the failure to do so violates the state plan, it does
not permanently disqualify the individual case for Title IV-E funds. 40 It
would appear that failure to meet these requirements renders the child's case
ineligible for Title IV-E funding until the proper court finding is made.4 1 The
permanency hearing is to determine whether and when the child will be
returned to their birth parent or placed for adoption, under legal guardians or
other permanent living arrangement, as well as the related issue of whether
34. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E); FLA. STAT. § 39.703(2) (2000); U.S. GENERAL AccoUNT-
ING OFFmic, supra note 19, at 4.
35. 45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(a), (c) (2000).
36. See FLA. STAT. § 39.402(2), (6), (8)(h) (2000).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(16) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); 45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(g)(1)-(2)
(2000); FLA. STAT. § 39.601(1)-(2), (9)(a) (2000).
38. 45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(b) (2000); FLA. STAT. §§ 39.402(8)(h)5., .506(7), .521(1)(t)
(2000).
39. The date of entry into foster care is the earlier of the date of the first judicial
hearing finding that abuse or neglect has occurred or 60 days after the child is removed from
his or her home. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(F) (Supp. IV 1998).
40. 45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(e) (2000). See also Davidson, supra note 12, at 772.
41. 45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(a) (2000); see 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C) (1994 & Supp. IV
1998).
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the state will file a petition for termination of parental rights.42 Florida law
calls for these matters to occur; 43 and 4) That the child's status is reviewed at
least every six months by the court or by administrative review for purposes
of assessing the safety and appropriate nature of the child's placement, the
need for ongoing placement, case plan compliance, and progress towards
reunification or other permanency goals. Florida law requires court review.
44
Aside from the foregoing, federal law leaves to the states development
of legal procedures and assignment of responsibilities within the dependency
system. While adopting the federal time standards, Florida sets forth in its
statutes rather detailed time standards and hearing schedules to direct de-
pendency litigation. Responsibility for various aspects of dependency pro-
ceedings and the substantive content of proceedings is also set forth in great
detail in Florida law.
B. Florida Dependency Law-Scrutinizing Every Move
A dependency case begins with a report of suspected child abuse or
neglect. By law, every person has the responsibility to report suspected child
abuse or neglect at the hands of a parent, custodian, care giver, or other
person responsible for a child's welfare. Reports are made to the Department
through its central abuse telephone hotline.4 5  Acting through its fifteen
districts, the Department then becomes primarily responsible for the welfare
of these children in a variety of ways and in an extensive manner.
After receiving a report, DCF is responsible for undertaking a protective
investigation to determine whether the child has been subjected to, or is at
risk of, abuse or neglect, except where that responsibility is transferred to a
county Sheriffs office (as it has been in four counties).46 Immediate investi-
gations are required if the immediate safety of a child is at risk or if the
family may flee from the investigation.47 In all other cases, an investigation
must begin within twenty-four hours, in conjunction with law enforcement if
warranted.48 Unannounced, onsite investigations are required, with specific
statutory requirements that in-person interviews must be had with the child,
42. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
43. See FLA. STAT. § 39.701(8)(e), (f) (2000).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(B) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); FLA. STAT. § 39.701(1)(a), (2)(a)
(2000); FLA. R . Juv. P. 8.410(e). "Administrative review" refers to a process, which is to be
open to the parents, of case review involving a panel of persons where at least one member is
not responsible for case management or service delivery to the child or parents. 42 U.S.C.
§ 675(6) (1994).
45. FLA. STAT. § 39.201(1), (2) (2000).
46. See §§ 39.201,.301,.3065.
47. § 39.201(5).
48. Id.
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any siblings, parents, and any other adult household members.49 The investi-
gation must also include various records checks on each household mem-
ber.50 A standardized risk assessment instrument must also be completed
within forty-eight hours of the initial report.
51
Where abuse or neglect is confirmed, the Department must decide
whether voluntary in-home services should be offered to the children and
parents involved or whether the child must be removed to ensure his or her
safety.5 2 A child must be removed in "high-risk" cases, loosely defined as
those involving young parents or custodians, the use of illegal drugs, or
domestic violence. The Department is required to complete its child
protective investigations within sixty days, with no exceptions provided at
law.54 A child may be taken into protective custody for up to twenty-four
hours by law enforcement or Department agents based on a probable cause
belief that abuse, neglect, or abandonment has occurred, or that there is
imminent danger of the same.55 Beyond twenty-four hours, a court order
finding probable cause is required, typically as a ruling on a "shelter petition"
at a "shelter hearing."56 The court must specifically find that removal is
necessary and that "appropriate and available services" would not change
that necessity.5 7 "Shelter" care is intended to be a "temporary" placement
"of a child who is alleged to be or who has been found to be dependent,
pending court disposition before or after adjudication," with a relative or
nonrelative, or a licensed home or facility. Without an adjudication of
dependency a child is not supposed to remain in shelter care for more than
sixty days. Similarly, a child is not to remain in shelter for more than thirty
days after adjudication unless an order of disposition has been entered.6
Following a shelter determination, a dependency case proceeds with the
filing of a dependency petition, followed by an arraignment, an adjudication,
and a disposition. Following or during an ongoing child protective investiga-
tion, formal dependency proceedings can be initiated in a circuit court by the
Department or any other person with pertinent information by filing a peti-
49. § 39.301(11).
50. § 39.301(9)(c).
51. § 39.301(9)(e).
52. See § 39.402.
53. § 39.301(8)(b).
54. § 39.301(14).
55. § 39.402(1)(a).
56. § 39.402(6)(b), (8)(a).
57. §§ 39.01(65), .401, .402(I)-(2), (8)(a), (h).
58. § 39.01(64).
59. § 39.402(13). Dependency is explained in more detail infra Part V.D.
60. Id.
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tion for dependency in the name of the child.61 A petition to terminate
parental rights may be filed at any time, but at the least, a dependency peti-
tion must be filed within twenty-one days of a hearing in which a child is
placed in shelter by court order, or within seven days of any party filing a
demand for early filing of a petition. 62 In any other case, a dependency
petition is to be filed within a "reasonable time" of the referral for protective
investigation.63
Arraignment hearings are to be conducted for any parent within twenty-
eight days of a child being placed in shelter care by court order, or within
seven days of filing a dependency petition if demand for early filing has been
made. 64 Likewise, in cases where a child is in shelter care, disposition
hearings are to be held within fifteen days of the arraignment if a parent
admits or consents to the findings of a dependency petition, absent a continu-
ance.65 If there is a denial, an adjudicatory hearing to determine whether a
child is dependent must be held within thirty days of the arraignment, absent
a continuance granted in accord with the law.66 Adjudication is necessary for
a child to remain in out-of-home placement.
67
Within thirty days of the adjudicatory hearing, a disposition hearing for
the purpose of receiving and considering a case plan and predisposition study
must be held. 8 The Department prepares the case plan and predisposition
study.69 A predisposition study includes, among other things, an assessment
of the parents' ability to meet a child's basic needs and care; an assessment
of the child's historical stability, including exposure to domestic violence;
the mental and physical health of the parents; the child's conduct at home,
school, and in the community; an assessment of the child's risk at home; and
resources available to address those risks, including prevention and reunifica-
tion services.
70
Disposition hearings are to be held as to any child adjudicated depend-
ent, at which time the case plan is supposed to be approved, though the court
may opt to do so at a second hearing within thirty days of the disposition. A
diligent search should have been completed for any parent who cannot be
located before a disposition hearing can go forward. At disposition, the court
61. §§ 39.501(1), .802(1); FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.220.
62 § 39.501(4).
63. Id.
64. § 39.506(1).
65. Id.
66 Id.
67. §§ 39.506(1), (5), .521(1)(a). Similar time frames exist for children who are still
in a parent's custody. See § 39.506(2).
68 § 39.507(7).
69. §§ 39.507(7), .521(a); see discussion infra Part V.C.
70. § 39.521(2).
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must approve several things. This includes approving the child's continued
placement in out-of-home care or custody, if this is the case, and setting any
special conditions on same, setting any "[e]valuation, counseling, treatment
activities, and other actions to be taken by the parties;" and identifying
supervisors or monitors of services; and child support matters.
71
Virtually every move in a dependency case is reviewed and approved by
the circuit court. As noted, there is almost immediate court involvement
when a child has been removed and placed in a temporary shelter. The court
reviews and approves continued placement in a shelter, and then conducts
shelter reviews at least within thirty days after the shelter hearing, and every
fifteen days thereafter, each time to review the child's status and approve the
continuation of the shelter placement. 72 These hearings continue beyond
arraignment and no more than fifteen days thereafter until a child is either
returned home or a disposition hearing is conducted. 73 Written determina-
tions regarding a child remaining in a shelter are required within twenty-four
hours of any time violation for filing a dependencypetition or before grant-
ing a continuance for holding a disposition hearing.7
At the disposition hearing, the court is to schedule the initial judicial
review essentially within ninety days, though the case plan review and
approval may be postponed for thirty days from the disposition hearing.75 In
no event is the initial judicial review to occur more than six months after the
child is removed from the home.76 Under all circumstances, the court is
required to review the status of any dependent child at least once every six
months, including as to case plan progress.
77
Under state law, there are to be no fewer than eight court hearings in a
year in every dependency case, presuming that all statutory deadlines are
met, no continuances are sought or granted, and no extraordinary circum-
stances arise requiring any hearing not otherwise dictated by law. Particularly
because of required shelter reviews every fifteen days, the number of hear-
ings can be much greater if the filing of a case plan is delayed or arraign-
ments are not timely held, problems which regularly occur as discussed
below. Due to delays, cases reviewed in this study would have required as
many as sixteen court hearings in a year.
Under concurrent case planning, the Department may be responsible for
simultaneously providing rehabilitative services to abusive or neglectful
parents and preparing to terminate the parental rights. The Department is
71. § 39.521(I)(d)3.; FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.340.
72 § 39.506(8).
73 Id.
74. §§ 39.402(14), .506(8).
75. § 39.521(1)(a), (c).
76. §§ 39.521(1)(c), .701(3)(a).
77. § 39.701(1)(a), (2)(a); FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.410(e), 8.415(b).
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directed that when children are removed from their homes, permanent
placement with a biological or adoptive family is to be "achieved as soon as
possible" and in no case are children to "remain[] in foster care longer than 1
year. 78 As the foregoing indicates, the court is to ensure that these goals are
met.
C. Case Plans as a Guiding Light Under Florida and Federal Law
Under federal and state law, the Department is responsible for develop-
ing a case plan with input from all parties. The plan is intended to be a tool
to direct a rehabilitative plan for parents and to coordinate services for
children, birth parents, and foster parents, whether or not a child is removed
from his or her home, or termination of parental rights is sought.79 Case
plans are to be prepared within sixty days of a child's removal from his or
her home. 0 Only for good cause shown should this be extended, and if so,
for no more than one extension of thirty days.8 1 Amendments, even with the
consent of all the parties, require court approval.8 2
In accord with the goal that children spend no more than twelve months
in foster care, case plans may only continue in effect for more than twelve
months if an extension is granted by the court.8 3 The twelve-month period
begins the earlier of the child's removal from the home or date of court
approval of the case plan.8 4 Case plans may be extended due to the Depart-
ment's failure to provide necessary services to the parents, but extensions are
limited to six months.85 There is no provision to extend a case plan based on
a parent's failure to meet plan requirements. Indeed, failure to comply
substantially is grounds to terminate parental rights.
8 6
D. Florida and Federal Law on Concluding Dependency Cases
In addition to the time standards of state and federal laws, a number of
substantive provisions apply to the conclusion of dependency cases. In cases
where reunification is an option, it is contingent on a showing that the parent
has "substantially complied with the terms of the case plan to the extent that
78. § 39.001(1)(h).
79. §§ 39.01(11), .601(1)(a); FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.400(a)(1), (2).
80. §§ 39.601(9)(a), .603(1); FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.400(a), 8.410(a).
81. § 39.601(9)(a); FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.400(a)(3), 8.410(c).
82. § 39.601(9)(f); FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.400(b).
83 § 39.601(7).
84. Id.
85. § 39.701(0; FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.415(e)(3).
86. §§ 39.601(3)(k),.703.
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the safety, well-being, and physical, mental, and emotional health of the child
is not endangered by the return of the child to the home.,8 7 However, termi-
nation of parental rights must be sought if a child is not returned home by the
twelve-month judicial review hearinF, and the petition for same must be filed
within thirty days of that hearing.8 - The standard for court waiver of this
requirement and extension of the case plan is extreme, "[o]nly if the court
finds that the situation of the child is so extraordinary" and in accord with the
child's best interests.8 9 The petition need not be filed if the child is being
cared for by relatives who choose not to adopt, or where the state has failed
to make reasonable efforts at reunification by providing appropriate services
to the parents.90
Once a petition for involuntary termination of parental rights is filed, an
advisory hearing is to be held as soon as possible, followed within forty-five
days by an adjudicatory hearing on the petition's merits, barring consent of
the parties otherwise, or based on a reasonable continuance for preparation or
attendance of witnesses, or under court rules, for good cause.9 At the advi-
sory hearing, parents are informed of their right to counsel and receive
appointed counsel, if appropriate. 92 The court must also consider whether the
parents will admit or deny the petition, or otherwise consent to the petition;
and appoint a guardian ad litem.93 At the adjudicatory hearing, the court
determines whether clear and convincing evidence exists to terminate paren-
tal rights.
94
In cases where the birth parents' rights are to be terminated, the perma-
nency options authorized by law include the favored goal of adoption, with
four other options if that is not achievable or in the child's best interest,
including: 1) legal guardianship; 2) long-term custody with an adult,
whether or not a relative of the child; 3) long-term licensed custody for
certain children over the age of fourteen; and 4) independent living.95 Long-
term custody can be a permanency option for any dependent child over
fourteen who has been in foster care for more than six months, reunification
at a later date is not precluded, and protective services or supervision are no
longer indicated. 96 Long-term licensed custody may be a permanency option
for children over fourteen years of age who have been in a stable foster care
87. § 39.522(2).
88. § 39.703(2).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. § 39.809(1), (2); FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.525(b).
92. FLA. R. Juv. P 8.510(a)(2).
93. Id.
94. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.525(a).
95. §§ 39.621-.624.
96. § 39.622(1)-(4).
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placement for more than twelve months, and continue the foster placement
until the child's majority.97 Independent living may be a permanency option
for children over the age of sixteen if found to be the most appropriate option
consistent with the child's safety.98
E. Representation of the Parties Under Florida and Federal Law
Court proceedings significantly influence how dependency cases impact
the parties. Providing for legal representation of the interests, perspectives,
and responsibilities for the various participants is rather disparate under
Florida law. The Department must be represented by an attorney in all
proceedings. 99 Depending on the particular district, the Department may be
represented by an in-house attorney, the state attorney's office, or the state
attorney general's office.
Birth parents are entitled to legal representation at all stages of depend-
ency proceedings, including appointed counsel if they are indigent, which
they typically are.10 By state law, the right to counsel arises at the time of
the shelter hearing such that if a parent arrives at a shelter hearing without
counsel, but requests one, the shelter hearing may be continued for up to
seventy-two hours to obtain and consult with counsel. 10 1 During that time,
the child remains in shelter care.102 The fees paid to court appointed attor-
neys for parents in dependency cases are limited by statute.'0 3 They are to be
paid by and as established by the county.1°4 In termination of parental rights
proceedings, compensation is capped at $1000 at the trial level and $2500 at
the appellate level, though these caps are raised at least in some counties
where warranted by the demands of the case.'05 There are no such caps
under state law on the expenditure per case by Department attorneys.
Under state law, the best interests of children are to be represented by a
guardian ad litem.10 6 Like their parents, an appointment is to be made at a
shelter hearing, unless the court finds it unnecessary. 0 7 However, unlike
their parents, there is no provision in state law to continue a shelter hearing
97. § 39.623.
98. § 39.624.
99. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.255(a).
100. § 39.013(9)(a).
101. § 39.402(5)(b).
102. Id.
103. See § 39.0134.
104 § 39.0134(1).
105. § 39.0134(2); Telephone Interview with Mary Ann Scherer, birth parent attorney,
in Ft. Lauderdale, Fla. (Aug. 16, 2000) (notes on file with author).
106. § 39.402(8)(c)1.
107. Id.
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because a guardian is not available or has not had time to consult with the
child or otherwise learn of the details of the case. A guardian ad litem is a
volunteer who need not be a licensed attorney competent to address a child's
legal interests. 10 8 The guardian him or herself, or another guardian ad litem
program representative, becomes a party to the proceedings, required to be
present for "all critical stages of the dependency proceeding," to review
disposition recommendations, and any proposed changes in a child's place-
ment.109 The duties of a guardian ad litem in representing "the interests of
the child" include: 1) investigating and reporting in writing to the court as to
the allegations of abuse or neglect and any other subsequently arising mat-
ters; 2) reporting to the court as to a child's wishes; and 3) making recom-
mendations to the court.'10 The Guardian Ad Litem Program does have a
limited number of staff attorneys. However, due to either a shortage of
volunteers or shortage of paid and skilled staff to supervise more guardians,
many children do not have a guardian to monitor their progress and safety, or
evaluate and report to the court on their best interests. " In the limited
instances where an attorney ad litem is appointed for a dependent child, there
are no statutory directives as to representation of a child's legal interests, nor
are there any directives in court rules, with the exception of a pilot program
for attorneys ad litem, discussed below."
2
Federal law does not require the appointment of an attorney to represent
a child in dependency cases, nor a court appointed special advocate, known
as a "CASA.""' 3 Commentators suggest that this leaves the child's interests
lacking for a need of an attorney .or similar advocate in dependency
cases. Federal law does require appointment of a guardian ad litem for
children who are the subject of judicial proceedings involving abuse or
neglect, though there is some debate as to whether this provision was in-
tended to require appointment of attorneys for children." 5 There is no
specific requirement that the state plan filed for Title IV-E funding eligibility
provide, in any particular fashion or manner, for legal representation for
children or the state in child welfare cases. Florida law simply does not
108. See §§ 39.820-.822; FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.215(c), (f).
109. § 39.822(3); FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.210(a).
110. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.215(c).
111. Wagner, supra note 1.
112. See FLA. H.R. COMM. ON CnmiREN AND FAMmlEs, HB 2125, 14 (May 24, 2000);
see also infra notes 302-07 and accompanying text.
113. Davidson, supra note 12, at 768.
114. Id. at 768-69.
115. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(A)(ix) (Supp. IV 1998). See also Susan Vivian Mangold,
Challenging the Parent-Child-State Triangle in Public Family Law: The Importance of
Private Providers in the Dependency System, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1397, 1450-51 (1999).
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guarantee that anyone in a dependency case will represent the child's legal
interests.
F. Assumptions of the Dependency System
Emerging from the laws creating Florida's dependency system are some
fundamental assumptions about the roles and expectations of the parties and
their representatives. The core assumption is that the DCF will act in accord
with the best interest of dependent children, even protect those interests, as it
fulfills the extensive duties assigned to it. The Department is entrusted with
the needs and care of dependent children, including safeguarding their inter-
est in family reunification or preservation. The Department is to plan a
course for those children and their families to achieve better health and
functioning. The Department is expected to balance tensions between the
needs of children and families with what services and resources may be
available. In many cases, the Department is expected to reconcile its role of
helping families reunite, while concurrently planning for and even pursuing
the family's demise. The Department's attorneys are expected to file and
prosecute civil dependency actions, literally acting in the name of the child
and, presumably, in accord with the best interests of the child, though their
client remains the Department itself.
It is likewise assumed that when volunteer guardians ad litem are ap-
pointed in dependency cases that they will advise the courts as neutral par-
ticipants to safeguard the best interests of children in a timely manner. As
the only party expressly charged with representing the best interests of
children, it may also be assumed that the guardian can and will act to monitor
the child's needs on a regular basis. It may also be assumed that the guardian
will promptly seek to remedy any failings of the system which threaten to
visit harm on the child. For children in out-of-home care, the guardian would
also presumably be a check on abuses in foster care or other such place-
ments.
There appears an expectation that the circuit court will oversee and
ensure in a timely manner that the Department and other parties act expedi-
tiously in the best interests of children and families. In an effort to ensure
that the courts actually do this, an extensive hearing schedule is established
by statute to review and approve everything that happens to a child and
everything that is planned for the child. The detail of the statute and its
demands for timely and extensive hearings suggest that none of the parties
were actually trusted when the statutes were written. A similar sentiment of
distrust can be construed from the painstaking detail of case plan require-
ments to guide the conduct of parties, discussed below. The courts check up
on everyone and the courts are told how and when to do this.
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It is presumed that the court can accomplish its oversight role based on
most probably complete information received from the other system actors,
including the DCF and its attorneys, the parents and their attorneys, and any
guardian ad litem who may be assigned to a child. This point is particularly
significant because the courts must necessarily rely upon information re-
ceived from the parties and the lawyers. As the National Council of Juvenile
and Family Court Judges (the "Council") recognizes, not only do attorneys
largely control what information a judge sees, but also that "[e]ach party
must be competently and diligently represented" for the system to function as
it is intended. 1 6 More significantly, the Council notes that the failure of
attorneys to behave timely, both in correcting errors and advancing cases,
adversely impacts "the quality and timeliness of the court's decision-
making"'  Child welfare professionals in Florida recognize that this is a
problem for Florida now, even as to statutorily required information at status
hearings." 8
It is presumed that the courts can and will act as a check to ensure that
all involved act at virtually every step and decision point in accord with the
best interests of the children involved. This basic structure and its core
assumptions, particularly as to the role of the court, exist nationally. The
Council observes that "judges make critical legal decisions and oversee
social services efforts to rehabilitate and maintain families, or to provide
permanent alternative care for child victims."'1 19 The current reliance on the
courts as the key mechanism to ensure that children are not re-abused or
neglected within or by the dependency or foster care system is one which has
certainly not escaped the courts' attention.12 The Council notes the "more
active" and "significant new role" the courts play in ensuring that "a safe,
permanent and stable home is secured" and making decisions for each de-
pendent child.
121
This present role of the courts, arising from changes in federal and state
law, including the Adoption and Safe Families Act ("ASFA"), constitutes a
significant expansion from their limited role in the 1970s to determine simply
whether a child had suffered from abuse or neglect, and whether in-home
services or out-of-home placement was the necessary response.1 22 The
116. NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUVENIE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES, RESOURcE
GuimmNEs; IMPROViNG COURT PRACTICE IN CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT CASES 22 (SPRING
1995), available at http:llwww.pppncjfcj.org/html/publications.html.
117. Id. at 10, 22; see also DUQUETTEETAL., supra note 5, at ch. VII.
118. Fourth Annual Dependency Court Improvement Summit, supra note 1.
119. NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES, supra note 116, at
10.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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expanded role necessitates handling more complex issues, more hearings,
and more people. Dependency litigation places courts in a "managerial and
directive" role, which is unsurpassed in the degree to which it intrudes into
the actions of an executive branch agency. The Council finds that "many
courts have neither the ability nor the resources to meet these new demands."
The demands on judges render the dependency division among the most
stressful, if not the most stressful, in a courthouse.12 3 The Council finds that
the present day structure of the dependency system effectively requires that
"step-by-step the judge must determine how best to assure the safe upbring-
ing of the child, and that the child is eventually placed in a safe and perma-
nent home."
If these statutory assumptions were seeing fruition when practically
applied, dependency cases might be progressing well and timely. However,
in practice, the assumptions of the dependency system are failing in many
cases. Dependency system participants are aware of this and trying to com-
pensate for the failures, and children and their families in the system are still
being hurt.
VI. PART 11-THE FINDINGS-HOW THE PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF
DEPENDENCY LAW RESULTS IN SIGNIFICANT HARM TO CHILDREN
A. Dependency Litigation Delays Are Harming Children Significantly
A foster child described her nine years in foster care this way:
I've moved most of my life and, I tell you, it's like a wave getting
ready to come for you while you are on the sea. And in my life, I
have experienced that, I am still experiencing it and I will experi-
ence it the rest of my life. It's like a storm getting ready to wreck
the ship and everything aboard, like my life, my soul, my heart, my
future.124
It is widely agreed that prolonged stays in foster care are detrimental in the
precise manner indicated by this child, resulting in serious, life-long prob-
lems.1 5 As reported by the National Conference of State Legislatures:
123. Interview with Judge John Frusciante, Circuit Judge, Fla. 17th Judicial Circuit, in
Ft. Lauderdale, Fla. (Aug. 18, 2000) (notes on file with author).
124. Madeleine M. Landrieu & Jesse R. Adams, Jr., On Behalf of Our Children, 46 LA.
B.J. 469, 470 (April 1999).
125. For an excellent report of first-hand experiences and perspectives of foster
children themselves, see Chaifetz, supra note 2.
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Child welfare experts generally agree that prolonged stays in foster
care and frequent moves from one foster home to another are not
conducive to a child's healthy development. Children who grow
up in foster care often exhibit emotional and behavioral problems
that contribute to expensive social problems such as school failure,
teen pregnancy, homelessness, unemployment, criminal activity,
incarceration and welfare dependency. 2
Similarly, the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges has
cited the "widely accepted principle[]" that "stable and continuous care
givers for children are very important to normal emotional growth... [and
that] children need secure and uninterrupted emotional relationships with
adults who are responsible for their care."1 27 Failing this, the Council ac-
knowledges damage to "a child's ability to form close emotional relation-
ships after reaching maturity."' 1 Legal commentators have recognized for
decades that even the best of foster care placements can be detrimental to
children, simply because they have been separated from the families and
lives that they know and to which they are bonded. As one commentator
explains, foster children "suffer anxiety and depression from being separated
from their parents, and they are forced to deal with new caretakers, play-
mates, school teachers, etc. As a result, they often suffer emotional damage
and their development is delayed.
129
The American Bar Association likewise recognizes these circumstances
in its model standards for lawyers who represent children:
In general, a child needs decisions about the custodial environment
to be made quickly.... [I]f the child must be removed from the
home, it is generally in the child's best interests to have rehabilita-
tive or reunification services offered to the family quickly.... [Ihf
it appears that reunification will be unlikely, it is generally in the
child's best interests to move quickly toward an alternative perma-
126. National Conference of State Legislatures, A Place to Call Home: Adoption and
Guardianship for Children in Foster Care: Executive Summary, at http://www.ncsl.org
programs/pubs/BKFSTR2.HTM (last visited May 15, 2001); see also Duquette et al., supra
note 5, at 130 (stating that "[l]ong delays in the courts and in matching children with nurturing
families are extremely detrimental to healthy emotional development").
127. NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES, supra note 116, at
13.
128. Id.
129. Michael S. Wald, Thinking About Public Policy Toward Abuse and Neglect of
Children: A Review of Before the Best Interests of the Child, 78 MICH. L. Rnv. 645, 662
(1980).
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nent plan. Delay and indecision are rarely in a child's best inter-
ests.
130
Unfortunately, Florida's foster children are subjected to delay and
indecision on a regular basis. The statewide average length of stay in active
cases for foster care children is almost three years, at 34.3 months (excluding
relative care giver cases), with a range among the fifteen DCF districts of
twenty-two months to fifty-six months.' 3' While the head of one DCF
district reportedly counters these statistics by explaining that the average stay
for children who have entered the system since 1997 is only two years,
statewide data still shows an increase in these numbers over the previous
year, when the average length of stay statewide was 32.4 months, with a
district range of twenty-six months to 55.6 months.1 33 The target of eighteen
months under the federal Adoption and Safe Families Act, which no district
meets.134 Similarly, as of August 1999, the percentage of dependent children
exiting foster care within fifteen months averaged only 26.4% statewide,
with a district range of 14.3 to 44.7%.135
Undue delay exists regardless of the permanency goal in the case. In
fiscal year 1995/1996, the statewide average length of stay in foster care with
a reunification goal was approximately 20.5 months, which actually crept up
to 23.3 months by 1999.136 In fiscal year 1995/1996, for termination cases
with a goal of adoption, the statewide average length of stay was approxi-
mately forty-five months. 37 These numbers are not far from the national
average stay in foster care of three years. 38 Not until parental rights are
terminated do delays ease for Florida's children. The average length of timefrom termination of parental rights to finalization in fiscal year 1998/1999
130. AMERICAN BAR Ass'N, STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR LAWYERS WHO REPRESENT
CHILDREN IN ABUSE AND NEGLECT CASES pt. I § B-5, commentaly (1996).
131. FLA. DEP'T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES, supra note 3, at FSP-027.
132. Carol Marbin-Miller, S. Fla. Kids 'Growing Up' in Foster Care, MIAMI HERALD,
Sept. 20, 2000, at IA.
133. See FLA. DEP'T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES, supra note 3, at FSP-027.
134. FLA. DEP'T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES, AUGUST 1999 SITUATION REPORT FSP-003
(Aug. 1999), available at http:llstate.fl.us/cf weblnewslmsptldocslsitrl0899admin.pdf.
135. kIL
136. FLA. DEP'T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES, PERFORMANCE REPORT, THIRD QUARTER,
FY 96/97 5 (June 1997), available at http:l/www5.myflorida.com/cfweb/myflorida/health
family/publications/bureaus/dcf/docs/3rdquart.pdf; OFFICE OF THE STATE COURTS ADMIN-
ISTRATOR MEANINGFUL REFORM ON THE FRONT LINES: DEPENDENCY COURT IMPROVEMENT
INrriATIvEs 1997-2000 (undated).
137. Id.
138. Duquette et al., supra note 5, at ch. I.
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was 12.52 months, compared with an ASFA goal of twelve months.1 39 This
would seem to indicate that advancing cases to termination of parental rights
or other such permanency determination is a more significant problem than
the process of finalizing a permanent placement once a child is legally
available for adoption or other permanency option.
Protracted dependency litigation and delayed permanency also impacts
foster families as a unit. At least one court has recognized the severe strain
on foster parents or prospective adoptive parents due to protracted litigation
and delayed permanency, and how those factors may put children at further
risk of unstable lives: "[a]t some point in time, custodial parents must earn
the right to claim a child permanently, lest they discharge their duty with
something less than completeness or worse yet, throw up their hands and
abandon their efforts for the sake of their own emotional well-being.
'14
As noted at the opening of this article, a glance into a typical day in
Florida's dependency system revealed one foster family, likely destined to be
an adoptive family, which simply crumbled under delay-induced stress. Not
only did the potential adoptive family fail to solidify, but the siblings may
now grow up without each other for support, a sense of stability, and the
nurturing experience of a family. Still, other families which may have
reunited never do simply because protracted litigation causes their bonds to
dissolve, an example of which was also seen with a glance into a typical day
in Florida's dependency system. Commentators have noted that a family's
integrity is increasingly eroded in its own eyes, as well as the community at
large, the longer children remain in foster care without final adjudication of
their cases. 14r Other families may simply have no chance when delays in
planning for and providing rehabilitative services clash with legal require-
ments for expediency, discussed in greater detail below. Several examples of
this were seen in the glance taken by this study into a typical day in Florida's
dependency system.
Like Florida, Connecticut courts have also suffered from difficulty
meeting basic statutory deadlines, with initial evidentiary hearings typically
being delayed twice as many days as permitted by statute in the mid-1990s,
though eventually recovering to an average much closer to statutory require-
ments. 42 In the interim, the state was sued in Pamela B. v. Ment 3 for
139. FLA. DEP'T OF CHMDREN & FAmLIs, supra note 134, at FSP-033.
140. In re Adoption of M.A.H., 411 So. 2d 1380, 1384 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
141. Pamela McAvay, Note, Families, Child Removal Hearings, and Due Process: A
Look at Connecticut's Law, 19 Qu~iNIc L. REv. 125, 137 (2000) (stating that "[w]here
investigation is improperly motivated, delay between removal and hearing simply allows more
time during which the internal and external perception of the parents and the family may be
denigrated")
142. See id. at 130.
143. 709 A.2d 1089 (Conn. 1998).
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constitutional due process violations. The fundamental constitutional right to
family integrity was at issue for taking several months to completely adjudi-
cate removal hearings. 44 The Pamela B. court recognized that judicial delay
can interfere with the constitutional right to family integrity to the degree that
any delay is only constitutionally justified to the extent it is "unequivocally
needed to safeguard and preserve the child's best interests."' 45 The court
spoke of a need for a "congruence of rights and remedies" in such cases,
which require timely and enforced hearing schedules. 146 Significantly, the
court found that its responsibility in this regard was restricted to the proper
allocation of its resources and that any remaining responsibility rested with
the legislature. 147 The court would not be responsible for delays, even if
considered objectively undue, if those delays resulted from a lack of appro-
priated resources.' 48
Similarly, in Florida, the Department's predecessor, the Department of
Health and Rehabilitative Services, was found in a class action lawsuit to
have violated statutory rights to six-month foster care review hearings by
failing to initiate such proceedings, "creat[ing] irreparable harm for which
injunctive relief is particularly appropriate. 9' 49 The court highlighted that the
statutory review hearings were intended to promote permanency and adop-
tion of foster children in out-of-home care for more than a year.'
144. McAvay, supra note 141, at 131-32.
145. 709 A.2d at 1100.
146. Id.
147. See id. at 1 101.
148. A concurring opinion in that case disagreed, asserting that a constitutional due
process violation occurred when the statutory time frame requiring a substantive hearing in ten
days was not met, taking instead up to six months under colloquially accepted continuances,
and that summary judgment on this point for the parents was warranted. Id. at 1110. (Berdon,
A.J., concurring) The concurring Justice highlighted the fact that fundamental constitutional
liberty interests were at issue, demanding that due process be afforded regardless of resource
allocation issues. Id. at 1111. The criticism of the majority opinion was blunt and direct,
stating:
[T]he majority would have us believe that the state could remove a child from
a parent's custody on the ground of neglect and then deny that parent a timely
hearing if [the court administrator] could prove insufficient resources caused
the delay. This reasoning is fundamentally flawed....
Any suggestion that this unusual theory of constitutional "hydraulics" can
dissipate the fundamental federal constitutional rights of the plaintiff class-
rights that do not depend upon the state's resources, [the court administra-
tor's] discretion or any other such state consideration-is also unavailing.
Pamela B., 709 A.2d at 1113.
149. Pingree v. Quaintance, 394 So. 2d 161, 162 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
150. Id.
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The integrity of the family unit is constitutionally protected, and there-
fore, more than worthy of protection under the actual functioning of law,
appropriately balanced with considerations of child safety. 5 ' The right to
family integrity is one to which a child has an equal claim to that of a par-
ent. 5  Federal courts have characterized this right for children in terms of
their interest in regular, emotional contact with their parents, stating, "[the
right to family integrity] is the interest of. . . the children in not being dislo-
cated from the 'emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily
association,' with the parent."' 53 As the foregoing demonstrates, expediency
in dependency litigation is inextricably tied with the best possible balance
between a child's interest in family integrity and a child's interest in stability
and permanent family placement.
For the foregoing reasons, this study finds that children in foster care in
Florida, likely thousands of them, are being significantly harmed by pro-
tracted delays in dependency litigation, before even addressing the day-to-
day conditions in foster care and even if the children appear to be physically
"safe." It cannot be assumed that children will be any safer or better off in
foster care than they were with their families of origin. While life for most
does improve markedly, many others are placed in neglectful and over-
crowded foster homes, many are subjected to serious physical violence and
sexual abuse from foster parents or other foster children, possibly of a worse
nature than they ever suffered with their birth parents, and some have even
died.154
These are not isolated risks. In one DCF district, at least sixty-five
foster homes currently have more foster children than the home is licensed to
have. 55 Last year, almost four hundred dependent children under protective
supervision either ran away or simply "aged out" of the system without
resolution of their cases. 56 Still others are believed to be subjected to worse
abuse in the system than experienced with their parents. Consider reports of
one child's lawyer, that in Broward County alone, some fifty instances of
child on child sexual abuse in foster care were brought to his attention in an
eighteen-month period. 57 Based on all of these conditions and risks, ad-
151. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
152. See Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equity & Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
153. Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 825 (2d Cir. 1977).
154. Interview with Howard M. Talenfeld, children's attorney/class action attorney, in
Ft. Lauderdale, Fla. (July 28, 2000) (notes on file with author).
155. Editorial, Foster Parents Needed, FLA. TMEs-UNION, May 22,1999, at B4.
156. Letter from Maria Leon, Family Safety, Fla. Dep't of Children & Families,
(enclosures) (Oct. 18, 2000) (on file with author).
157. National Coalition for Child Protection Reform, Foster Care vs. Family Preserva-
tion: The Track Record on Safety, text at note 5 (citing Aff. of David S. Bazerman, Esq., filed
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dressing the factors which cause dependency litigation to be delayed is
warranted.
B. Gobbledy Guck, Cookies and Other Debris Gunking up the System
A main statutory mechanism under state and federal law enacted to
ensure timely permanency for children is the required court hearing to ap-
prove a permanency goal within twelve months of children entering the
system. This is a key indicator of system efficacy. One of the main reasons
that permanency is not being achieved timely is that often these hearings are
simply not being held within twelve months. 158 Some data and anecdotal
experience gathered by others suggest why, as do matters observed in this
study.
As noted, in a typical day in Florida's dependency system observed in
this study, cases simply were not advancing in accord with interim time
deadlines leading up to the one-year permanency hearing. Adjudications
were not occurring within twenty-eight days and the Department was seeking
extensions of time to do so, and in one case seeking and obtaining from the
court sixty additional days in a case already five months old. Case plans to
map the progress of a case were being prepared as much as three months late,
when the law provides for only sixty days to prepare the plan. Department
investigations were not being completed timely and lengthy continuances of
court proceedings were being granted. Department attorneys were simply
not communicating with their client to verify and assess progress and com-
pliance with the law.
Observations made on that typical day are confirmed by the Department
itself and others to be, indeed, typical and widespread. In one judicial circuit,
a committee of a dependency court improvement program concluded that the
Department is simply not prepared to address permanency at one year due to
a failure to staff cases for permanency far enough in advance. 59 In accord
with this conclusion, a preliminary investigation by federal officials, as to
state response to ASFA, finds that Florida has not incorporated changes into
its social work practice relating to ASFAs requirement that termination
petitions be sought for any parent whose child is in foster care for fifteen of
in Ward v. Feaver, Case # 98-7137, U. S. District Court, Southern District of Fla. (Dec. 16
1998)), at http://www.nccpr.org/newissues/1.html (last visited May 15, 2001).
158. Margaret Taylor, Financial Administrator, Fla. Dep't of Children & Families,
Address at Fourth Annual Dependency Court Improvement Summit, Prelude to ASFA Audit
(workshop) (Aug. 30, 2000) (notes on file with author).
159. Fla. 17th Judicial Circuit Dependency Court Improvement Program, Children's
Services Comm., Notes on "Permanency Delays" (April 2000) (on file with author).
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twenty-two consecutive months.16° Federal officials also note the need for
"establishing effective working relationships with agency attorneys" which
could also impact on Departmental awareness and planning for statutory
guidelines in individual cases.
161
The Department itself has identified, in its handling of dependency
litigation, extensive failures to use state and federally authorized mechanisms
to advance cases promptly. When the Department audited cases in eight of
its districts for pursuing expedited termination of parental rights in cases of
the most egregious abuse or neglect, no district had qualified cases which
were regularly supported by a court finding to expedite the case, and in only
one district were petitions for expedited termination filed in all cases. 162 in
the best of the remaining districts, petitions for expedited termination were
filed in only forty-three percent of the audited cases. One district was found
to file expedited petitions in as few as fourteen percent of qualified cases,
while one district completely failed to file in any of its cases. These failures
keep foster children from being available for adoption and compromise their
ability to ever be adopted as they grow older and older in "temporary"
care.1
63
The Department similarly identified a widespread failure to take advan-
tage of concurrent case planning as a method of expediting cases. In appli-
cable cases, the Department found that more often than not its districts fail to
place children in a home that could serve as an adoptive placement or with a
legal custodian while reasonable efforts for reunification were pursued
concurrently. Concurrent case planning was not pursued in as much as
ninety-three percent of qualifying cases in one DCF district. The average
failure rate among districts was over sixty-eight percent.164 Another study
specific to dependency cases in Hillsborough County similarly found that a
lack of concurrent case planning was a "barrier" to achieving permanence for
children, calling it "one of the most frequently observed" problems. 165
160. U.S. GENERAL ACCOuNTING OFFCE, supra note 19, at 8-9.
161. Id. at 9.
162. See Address by Taylor, supra note 158. The Department used an auditing
procedure identical to that which the federal government will use to determine Florida's
compliance with the Adoption and Safe Families Act. Id. For a detailed description of audit
procedures, see U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HuMAN SERvs., CHrD AND FAMILY SERvICES
REviEws, PROCEDURES MANUAL ch. 4 (Aug. 2000).
163. The courts were typically more responsive. In cases where the expedited petition
was actually filed, termination hearings were conducted within 60 days in as high as 75
percent of the cases in one district, though none was held in District Fourteen. The remaining
districts for which data was available had hearings held within 60 days 60, 50, 38, and 20
percent of the time. Letter from Taylor, supra note 28.
164. Id.
165. BARRETr, supra note 5, at 23.
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It is critical to recognize that simply conducting court hearings and
issuing court orders is apparently not sufficient to ensure timely progress of
cases. A Department audit of its files found cases where court orders were
signed several months after a hearing because Department attorneys failed to
provide drafts to judges as ordered. In one case, a draft order directing the
Department to file a petition for termination of parental rights within ninety
days of the hearing was sent to the judge 150 days after the hearing. The
petition had not been filed, a fact not detected by the court and not remedied
by any participant to the proceedings. 166 A case worker supervisor reported
regular delays of six to seven weeks in getting court orders signed because
Department attorneys were not sending orders. 167 Problems of this type
prompted one judge interviewed for this study to request resources for a case
coordinator to check on the status of compliance with court orders, recogniz-
ing that simply rendering an order is not enough to ensure that action ordered
to ensure the best interests children is actually taken timely.
168
Lest all the blame be placed on the Department, it warrants note that the
courts themselves acknowledge that their functioning is a significant prob-
lem. The National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges states:
in many jurisdictions, the quality of the court process has gravely
suffered. Hearings are often rushed in child abuse and neglect
cases. There are also frequent and unfortunate delays in the timing
of hearings and decisions, causing children to grow up without
permanent homes. Many courts know little about relevant agency
operations or services. All too often, child welfare agency em-
ployees spend unnecessary hours waiting for court hearings while
they could be "out working in the field."'169
Especially with heavy and increasing case loads, time to "work in the
field" is critical, particularly as to case planning and execution. Numerous
child welfare professionals interviewed in this study reported that the amount
of time spent in statutorily mandated court hearings detracts from the abili 0
of caseworkers to spend time with dependent children and assist parents.
The impact on parents is also significant. As one judge interviewed for this
study emphasized, parents are attending excessive court hearings rather than
166. Address by Taylor, supra note 158.
167. Confidential Interview in Broward County, Fla. (Sept. 29, 2000) (notes on file
with author).
168. Interview with Judge Frusciante, supra note 123.
169. NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES, supra note 116, at
10.
170. See Confidential Interviews, supra notes 1 & 4; Telephone Interview with
Scherer, supra note 105.
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being at work or attending rehabilitative services, giving rise to a plea that
we "get these people out of this building" for their own good.
171
While court time is a factor, it must also be concluded that low quality
in case planning is a significant problem. While case plans are intended by
statute to be individualized to the needs of the families involved and a unique
map of how many families can be restored, a Department audit of cases in
eight of its districts found that only one district regularly maintained indi-
vidualized case plans, with goals "behaviorally stated and measurable." On
average, the remaining seven districts failed to do so in twenty-five percent
of their cases.172 Case plans are routinely "cookie cutter" in nature, rather
than being tailored to the specific needs of the children and families in-
volved. 173 In some cases, "cookie cut" case plans, which obtain court ap-
proval, fail to comply with logic and the facts of the case. A Department
audit discovered at least one case plan which discussed the efforts of birth
parents in a completely different case towards meeting reunification tasks.
The case in which the plan was filed and approved was solely a termination
case, in which reunification services were not being pursued at all.174
The failure to include parents and guardians in case plan development
was also independently observed in this investigation.175 In addition, De-
partment officials acknowledge that, "routinely parents are not included in
case planning, and reasons are not documented," and further that, "many
[DCF] districts are not developing case plans within sixty days of removal,"
as is legally required. 76 It appeared in this study that the practical impact of
failing to include parents in case plans was to render the plans impracti-
cal. For example, it was regularly acknowledged by child welfare officials
and even a judge that case plans are knowingly written to include rehabilita-
tive services which parents cannot access for lack of transportation, a prob-
lem even in urbanized areas. The Department reports that standards of care
171. Interview with Dorian Damoorgian, Circuit Judge, Fla. 17th Judicial Circuit (Nov.
1, 2000) (notes on file with author).
172. Letter from Taylor (enclosures), supra note 28.
173. Fourth Annual Dependency Court Improvement Summit, supra note 1, with
reports from at least four DCF districts.
174. Address by Taylor, supra note 158.
175. Visit to DCF Service Center, North Lauderdale (Sept. 29, 2000). During this visit,
a case worker, who requested anonymity, acknowledged preparing a case plan unilaterally for
a hearing the next business day. The case worker requested anonymity (notes on file with
author).
176. Address by Taylor, supra note 158. One should not conclude that the DCF is the
only party responsible for delays in case plan development. For example, one case was
reported in this study in which a birth parent insisted on use of her psychologist, which caused
delay, as the DCF needed to check the psychologist's credentials. Interview with Judge
Frusciante, supra note 123.
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can vary significantly in different areas of the state.177 Parents, guardians,
dependency system attorneys, and department officials all reported that case
plans are regularly difficult to understand, particularly for parents of limited
formal education. 78 One Department official described case plans as "gob-
bledly guck."'179 This consensus is all the more troubling considering that
courts must review and approve all case plans.
Another study, which performed a case-by-case sampling and review of
sixty dependency cases in Hillsborough County, similarly found case plans
lacking in addressing the comprehensive needs of families to achieve reunifi-
cation. That study found that most cases failed to address services needed to
resolve such core "collateral" issues contributing to family disfunction as,
"substance abuse, domestic violence, or chaotic lifestyles." 80  Appropriate
case plans "were the exception, rather than the rule." 181 Similarly, case plans
often fail to include all tasks and services ordered by the court. Only in one
of its districts did the DCF find that all case plans included all court ordered
tasks and services. The remaining audited districts failed in at least five
percent of the cases and in as much as forty-four percent of the cases, with an
average failure rate among audited districts of twenty-three percent.1 82
Moreover, case plans effectively continue beyond their expiration without
required court approval in "many areas" and case plans are extended because
the Department has failed to provide reasonable efforts towards reunifica-
tion. 83
The problems extend beyond simply writing a good case plan. The
Department's failure to provide timely services can directly hinder the ability
of parents to comply with case plan requirements. Typical of the complaints
that this study received from birth parent attorneys was that of a birth parent
required to pass fifteen random drug screenings within the time frame of the
case plan. As of the date the case plan expired, the Department had only
subjected the parent to three screenings, causing the case to be delayed. Such
177. Telephone Interview with Vilchez, supra note 1; Confidential Interviews of May
23, 2000 and July 26, 2000, supra notes I & 4; Interview with Judge Frusciante, supra note
123; FLA. DEP'T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIEs, COMPREHENSIVE PLAN TO REORGANIZE THE
DEPARTmT OF CHnIDRN AND FAnUS 6 (Jan. 1, 2000).
178. Fourth Annual Dependency Court Improvement Summit, Case Conferencing
Workshop and Circuit Breakout, supra note 1; Interview with Wagner, supra note 1; Tele-
phone Interview with Scherer, supra note 105; Confidential Interview, supra note 4;
Confidential Telephone Interview with birth parent in Broward County (Oct. 2, 2000) (notes
on file with author).
179. Interview with Allegretti & Sanford, supra note 7.
180. BARRET, supra note 5, at 22.
181. Id.
182. Letter from Taylor (enclosures), supra note 28.
183. Address by Taylor, supra note 158.
[Vol. 25:547
34
Nova Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 3 [2001], Art. 2
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol25/iss3/2
Dolce
failures can cause even further delay. For example, the delay may cause a
need for an updated psychological evaluation ' 4  Another experienced
dependency attorney interviewed for this study reported extended delays
waiting for department action, such as waiting for approval of a psychologi-
cal evaluation and another cited one case in which a DCF expert witness took
nine months to complete a report.18 5 Similar problems were cited by a
committee of one judicial circuit's dependency court improvement project,
described as a "waiting list for services," and further that new tasks are added
after completion of those in the written case plan. 86 Reports of identical
problems were cited by a Department caseworker supervisor.
87
An independent study of dependency cases in Hillsborough County
finds conclusively that these conditions delay cases and, necessarily, perma-
nency and stability that children need for their safety and health:
delays [by the Department] in following up with parents led judges
and parents' attorneys to demand additional time for the parent to
complete case plan tasks, and therefore extended children's time in
temporary out-of-home care. This, in addition to frequency of
movement, led children to have increasing problems with attach-
ment and behavioral development.
1 88
C. Social Conditions Joining Public Policy to Harm System Efficacy
The dependency system's overall case load can impact the length of
dependency litigation in each individual case. There has been a significant
increase in the child welfare caseload in recent years, including a rapid
escalation in the number of reports of suspected child abuse or neglect and
responsive protective investigations. The number of calls to the child abuse
hotline from August 1998 to August 1999 increased fifty-three percent.'8 9
The past five years has seen a sixteen percent increase in the number of
investigations, from 109,869 to 127,859.' Caseload increases do not appear
to be due merely to population increases, because the number of investiga-
184. Telephone Interview with Vilchez, supra note 1.
185. Telephone Interview with Scherer, supra note 105. Telephone Interview with
John Coleman, in Ft. Myers, Fla. (Aug. 17, 2000) (notes on file with author).
186. See Fla. 17th Judicial Circuit Dependency Court Improvement Program, Chil-
dren's Services Comm., supra note 159.
187. Confidential Interview with DCF caseworker in Broward County (Sept. 29, 2000)
(notes on file with author).
188. BARREIT, supra note 5, at 23.
189. FLA. DEP'TOFCHILDREN & FAMmns, supra note 9 at 4.
190. Id. at 2.
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tions per 1000 children in the past five years has risen from 32.3 to 37.2.191
This has contributed to a significant increase in the number of cases of
verified abuse or neglect. For example, in Hillsborough county, the number
of verified reports of child maltreatment increased ten percent in just one
year.1 92 The Department identifies three social conditions as the main con-
tributors to a rise in the incidence of abuse and neglect, including rising
substance abuse among adults, lack of affordable child care, and increasing
incidence of family violence. 
193
The societal dynamics contributing to high case loads may not yet have
been met with sufficient resources, as the Department is calling for additional
resources and alternative approaches to prevention, including greater funding
of the primary prevention program sponsored by the Department, Healthy
Families Florida. 194 Prevention efforts may need substantial reinforcement,
as they appear inadequate now. At present, only forty-three of Florida's
sixty-seven counties even have the main child abuse prevention program
provided through the Department, Healthy Families Florida, and a few more
counties only have partial coverage. The fiscal year 2000-2001 budget
allocation of the child abuse and prevention program is $24.5 million. By
contrast, spending for intervention after child abuse or neglect that has
already occurred is almost twenty times that amount, at $482.8 million. 195
Failing to address this disparity will have long-term impact. The De-
partment reports that because prevention services are currently insufficient,
there is a risk of more serious problems for children, families, and the state at
large to face later "many other critical services, particularly in the area of
prevention and early intervention, remain limited or nonexistent. As a result,
many individuals and families are unable to access services until they are in
crisis when the costs in dollars and human terms are much higher.'
196
A related issue is the impact on current resources from the growing
number of children removed from their families. Removal of a child places
particular stress on the child welfare system, because removal requires
financial and other resources to address greater needs, perhaps most signifi-
cantly, recruiting suitable foster homes. The number of children alleged to
be victims of abuse or neglect who enter out-of-home care is increasing
significantly. Hillsborough County, for example, saw a staggering eighty
percent increase in the number of children entering out-of-home care from
191. Id.
192. Elizabeth Bettendorf, Report: Child Abuse Climbs 10%, TAMPA TRmuNE, Oct.
25, 2000.
193. FLA. DEP'T OFCH.DREN & FAMILIEs, supra note 9, at 2-3.
194. Id. at 4.
195. Id. at DCF/Faniily Safety charts 2-4.
196. FLA. DEP'TOF CHDREN & FAMILIEs, supra note 177, at 6.
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1999 to 2000.'97 However, it does not appear that child removal cases are
out pacing the increase in the total number of cases. Statewide, a recent
measure showed an eighteen percent increase in child protective investiga-
tions, but only a thirteen percent increase in the number of children in foster
care.
198
Notwithstanding data indicating a lack of proportional increases in
dependent children being removed from their families, many child welfare
professionals believe that removal often occurs when it is not needed. The
primary reason cited is a lack of sufficient in-home services.' 99 A sampling
and review of dependency cases in Hillsborough County by child welfare
professionals concluded that the availability of in-home services would have
prevented removal in five percent of the cases.20 In another DCF District,
the District Administrator reportedly estimates that some thirty-five percent
of her District's foster children could have been left with their families of
origin if appropriate services had been available.01
Aside from a lack of in-home services, many attribute unnecessary
removal of children from their families to a perceived shift in Departmental
philosophy, originating with the Department's Secretary. It is asserted that
the Secretary has created an atmosphere of overreaction in the "emergency"
removal of scores of children by caseworkers and investigators attempting to
protect their jobs, while claiming "safety" for children. The criticism has
been put this way:
[Secretary] Kearney's policies set off a foster-care panic. Workers
quickly got the message that they could be suspended, fired, maybe
even prosecuted for wrongly leaving a child in his or her own
home. But take away scores of children needlessly from loving
homes and, while enormous harm would come to the child, the
workers and their jobs were safe.2°2
197. BARRETT, supra note 5, at 5.
198. TEEA MARKOWrIZ, FLORIDA COMMUNITY BASED CAPE EVALUATION 1999-2000
7 (rev. Mar. 17, 2000) (prepared for the Fla. Dep't of Children & Families).
199. Fourth Annual Dependency Court Improvement Summit, Circuit Breakout and
Case Conferencing Workshop; supra note 1; Interview with Karen Gievers, supra note 1;
Confidential Interview of May 23, 2000, supra note 1; Interview with George B. Atkinson,
Program Administrator, Broward Sheriff's Office, Child Protective Investigations Section, in
Plantation, Fla. (July 27, 2000) (notes on file with author).
200. BARRE-r, supra note 5, at 21.
201. Richard Wexler, Children Paying High Price for Panic at DCF, PALM BEACH
POST, Oct. 1, 2000, at 1E.
202. Id.
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The perception is shared by others. One news account characterized the
Department's philosophy as, "remove [the] child at all costs," while noting
that a child's death resulted in the suspension or firing of five workers and
resignation of the two top district administrators.2 3 One may also find
historical support for this belief in an appellate case concerning a ruling by
the DCF Secretary, while serving in her previous capacity as a circuit judge
in the dependency division.2°4 In that case, she was cited for "bureaucratic
overkill" for erring too much on the side of caution in the interest of child
safety.2°5 A DCF official, speaking on the condition of anonymity, reported
in this study that, "I don't dare say 'reunification' in [the Secretary's] pres-
ence."2 6 Another Department spokeswoman is reported to have described a
"new philosophy" at the DCF under Secretary Kearney's leadership this
way: "If there's even a shadow of doubt about safety, that child will be
removed.... Our new philosophy is to remove the child at all costs. 20 7
However, the Secretary attributes current conditions not to any personal
disposition, but rather a necessary reaction to the federal Adoption and Safe
Families Act and to the state Kayla McKean Child Protection Act.208 Others
apparently agree with her. The National Center for Youth Law reports a
"widespread impression among [Florida] caseworkers and administrators that
ASFA 'ended family preservation,"' as well as a general belief that this
federal legislation is "widening the net" of children placed in out-of-home
care. M 9 A report prepared for the Department likewise concludes that the
Kayla McKean Act causes "a built-in implication that.., if one is to err in
their professional judgment, the error must be on the side of safety for the
child.' 210 At least one attorney who regularly represents birth parents re-
ported to this study that if too many children are being removed, the Kayla
McKean Act is the reason.2 Other Department officials indicate that the
Department's philosophy actually has a greater emphasis on preserving
families, reporting the Department's efforts to fund and promote community
203. Sarah Eisenhauer, Foster Parent Shortage on Treasure Coast 'A Crisis' Officials
Say, FORT PIERCE NEWS, July 9, 1999, at A4.
204. See In re C.G., 570 So. 2d 1136, 1137 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
205. Id.
206. Confidential Interview with child welfare professional, public sector supervisory
employee, in West Palm Beach, Fla. (June 13, 2000) (notes on file with author).
207. Eisenhauer, supra note 203, at A4.
208. Gwyneth K. Shaw, Parents Say State Overreacts, ORLANDO SENTINEL, June 11,
2000, at B 1.
209. MARTHA MAT'HEWS & MICHELLE C-ENG, REPORT ON CHILD WELFARE
ADVOCATES' CONFERENCE, YOUTH LAW NEWS 3 (undated report of Nat'l Center for Youth
Law conference held November 5-6, 1999).
210. MARKowrrz, supra note 198, at 9.
211. Telephone Interview with Scherer, supra note 105.
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involvement in prevention efforts, consistent with the agency's published
212
strategic plan.
Given the noted statistical evidence that the proportion of abuse and
neglect cases which result in removal of children has not increased under
Secretary Kearney's stewardship, the claim that she has created an atmos-
phere of overreaction to almost arbitrarily remove children would be hard to
endorse. Likewise, the percentage of confirmed cases of abuse and neglect
where children are actually removed remains relatively low at approximately
seven percent.2 3 Also noteworthy is the fact that over the past five years (the
Secretary was appointed two and a half years ago) approximately the same
percentage of all protective service cases, sixty percent, are closed with the
children remaining with or being reunified with their parents. 14
The evidence indicates that any "unnecessary" removal of children is
occurring due to a lack of in-home services, which accords with legal stan-
dards described above, not from any personal philosophy of Secretary Kear-
ney. It would actually be more appropriate to recognize these cases as
"avoidable" removals. As noted, federal and state law, which the Secretary
is obligated to enforce, were amended at approximately the same time her
tenure began to require removal of children when "available" services will
not render the child safe in the home. At most, the anecdotal evidence would
indicate that the Secretary requires personal accountability from child wel-
fare professionals not to look past dangers to children based on consideration
of scare resources, which is certainly a commendable policy in the best
interests of children and in accord with the law. The issue raised by this
debate is whether the child welfare system at large is equipped to redress
timely, and on a case-by-case basis, the inappropriate removal of children
from their homes which can happen in individual cases. It is submitted that it
is not due to the lack of independent representation for children's legal
interests and the lack of reasonable assurance that court proceedings will
adhere to statutory deadlines necessary for the health and welfare of children,
as more fully explored below.
212. Shaw, supra note 208; Interview with Allegretti & Sanford, supra note 7; FLA.
DEP'T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES supra note 9.
213. FLA. DEP'T OF CILDREN & FAMIIES, CHILD PRRo'irEnv SERVICES, ANNUAL
STATISTiCAL DATA TABLES, FIScAL YEAR 1998-99 Table D-2, available at http://
www5.myflorida.co mLcf-web/MyfloridalhealthfamiIy/publications/childrensissues/childabuse/
9899chnt.pdf. This is the most recent data available. See Letter from Maria B. Leon, Family
Safety, Fla. Dep't of Children & Families (July 31, 2000) (on file with author).
214. See Letter from Leon (enclosures), supra note 156.
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D. On Visitation Resources and Family Integrity
On that typical day in Florida's dependency system, when a judge
learned that a DCF case worker had blocked contact between a mother and
her nine-year-old child for nine months without court approval and in contra-
vention of state law, the judge queried as to how the case worker expected to
achieve reunification for the family, which was the case plan goal, by keep-
ing the family apart.215 The judge's query recognized not only the child's
constitutionally protected interest in the integrity of her family unit, but also
the practical and significant damage done to the parent-child bond when
contact is deprived for a protracted period of time. Florida courts have also
recognized expert testimony that a lack of sufficient visitation can deprive a
parent of an opportunity to demonstrate the ability to safely parent a child
and thereby achieve reunification. 16
Department officials expressed confusion over whose rights are at issue
regarding visitation, specifically whether it is a right of the child or a right of
the parent.217 In practice, visitation is so infrequent as to be almost meaning-
less in maintaining the child's bond to a parent. There appears consensus in
the child welfare community that foster children are developing attachment
disorders due to the limited visitation they are afforded with their parents, a
devastating condition that harms the child's ability to form bonded relation-
ships with anyone. 18 Visitation occurs once a month at best in most cases 19
Visitation occurs frequently in locations which are impersonal and intimidat-
ing to parents and perhaps even the children, like a courthouse or at DCF
offices. There are efforts to make visitation rooms appear like a "home" with
noninstitutional furniture and ddcor, as were viewed in this study, but the
parental awareness of the circumstances and surroundings calls into question
the fairness of DCF workers subsequently critiquing parents in court for
220
showing a lack of "intimacy" with their children during visitation.
215. Under Florida law, visitation is supposed to be granted absent clear and convinc-
ing evidence that such would not be in the child's best interest. FLA. STAT. § 39.402(9)
(2000). Visitation is to be ordered at the time of arraignment for any child in out-of-home
placement, unless there is a "clear and convincing showing that visitation is not in the best
interest of the child." § 39.506(6).
216. See Simms v. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs., 641 So. 2d 957, 963 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1994) (Jorgenson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
217. Interview with Allegretti & Sanford, supra note 7.
218. Fourth Annual Dependency Court Improvement Summit, supra note 1.
219. Telephone Interview with Vilchez, supra note 1.
220. A visitation room was viewed during the course of this study in DCF District 10
on September 29, 2000. Additional testimony on this point was received from Vilchez, supra
note 1.
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It would stand to reason that it is hard for a parent and child to maintain
or improve a close relationship with visitation only once a month. However,
Florida law does not even guarantee that to a child and a parent, setting only
nonbinding "goals" for children who are in shelter or foster care to visit with
their parents "at least" once a month, and siblings once a week.221 Time and
again in this study it was made clear that greater frequency of visitation
would only be possible with greater resources, and that monthly visitation
was often not achieved. Case workers already burdened with case loads
above recommended levels and still spending too much time in court, away
from the children who are their wards, lack the time to supervise visitation
more frequently, not to mention scheduling problems with case plans that
require parents to be at work during the same hours that supervised visitation•222
is offered. It will be truly hard to ever forget the faces of the mom and the
dad, holding hands and choking back tears on that typical day in Florida's
dependency system, as they tried to find words to explain how they could
give up on reunifying their family after three years because their daughter
simply did not know them any more.
E. The Significance of a National Problem
Florida is not alone in the nature or extent of dependency system prob-
lems, the tragedies it creates, and those it fails to stop. State child welfare
systems nationally face questions about their efficacy. 2 3 The federal gov-
ernment acknowledges that state programs are "plagued" by problems,
including substantially increasing caseloads, persistent and growing social
conditions contributing to the incidence of abuse and neglect, and weak-
nesses in state response systems, all of which are present in Flor-
ida. Workforce issues and poor agency relations with the courts are also
specifically identified.22 Similarly, the efficacy of court involvement is
221. FLA. STAT. § 39.4085(15), (16) (2000).
222. Confidential Interview of May 23, 2000, supra note 1; Confidential Interview of
July 26, 2000, supra note 4; Interview with Lisa Magrino, Program Operations Administrator
(District 10), Fla. Dep't of Children & Families (Sept. 29, 2000) (notes on file with author);
Telephone Interview with Vilchez, supra note I.
223. National Conference of State Legislatures, Child Welfare Project: New Direc-
tions for Child Protective Services, Executive Summary, at http://www.ncsl.org/pro-
gramslcyf/cpsexsum.htm (last visited May 15, 2001) (stating that "[Child Protective Services]
is widely viewed as a system in crisis.... [n]ot protecting children from abuse and ... not
supporting families that need help."); Duquette et al., supra note 5, at 93. (stating that "[t]he
need for comprehensive reform of child welfare policies and systems has long been evident.")
224. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE HONORABLE NYDIA
VELAZQUEZ, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, CHILD PROTECrIvE SERvIcES: COMPLEX CHAL-
LENGES REQuiRE NEw STRATEGrES 6-7 (July 1997) (GAO/HEHS-97-115).
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cited, with causes for delays in permanency identified as high case volume,
inefficient case scheduling, and unprepared and burdened attorneys, all
factors identified in this study as problematic in Florida.225
Along with growing public awareness and increased reporting of child
abuse and neglect, the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges
cites poverty, drug use, and dissolved family units as social conditions
contributing to increased case volume, similar to the problems identified by
Florida's DCF.226 A major critique of child welfare systems nationally is a
belief that resources for investigation and prosecution of abuse and neglect
are overemphasized, while insufficient resources are directed to families in
need of services to address these problems, including preventative or reme-
dial services. 227 Again, like Florida.
Commentators in other states lament the same impact on foster children
which concern Florida. These comments about Louisiana's dependency
system could just as soon have been made about Florida:
Unfortunately, in Louisiana and across our nation, too many chil-
dren go to sleep at night not knowing where they will be tomor-
row. These are our nation's foster care children.... It is not
enough that these children are abused and neglected but, once re-
moved from their homes by the state in an effort to protect them,
their fate often does not improve. Too many of these children end
up in "foster care drift" and spend their childhood waiting either to
be reunited with their families or to be placed in new homes. Far
too many of them simply wait away their childhood. 22
The reasons identified for problems in dependency systems are also
shared from state to state. Consider, for example, a recent task force report
to the Georgia Department of Human Resources citing inadequate prevention
resources and a lack of a comprehensive plan to address problems within its
child welfare agency.229 Specifically cited are inexperienced and inade-
quately trained caseworkers, high caseloads, and, notably, systemic "mis-
trust" marked with private providers who "fear retribution and negative
225. Id. at 12.
226. NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES, supra note 116, at
10; see also, National Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 223.
227. State and federal expenditures for out-of-home care total approximately seven
billion dollars annually, more than is spent on child abuse prevention, child protection, family
support and adoption services combined. National Conference of State Legislatures, supra
note 126.
228. Landrieu, supra note 124, at 469-70.
229. GA. DEP'T OF HUM. RES., CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICE TASK FORCE REPORT TO THE
COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES 3 (Apr. 20, 2000).
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consequences" for raising complaints about the functioning of the state
agency. 230 Similar problems are reported in Pennsylvania, where at least one
county-based child welfare agency is alleged to be interfering with the ability
of birth parents to accomplish goals to achieve reunification.231 Of note,
there is a specific allegation that supervised visitation with foster children is
"routinely" scheduled when parents have to be at work, and that the parents
are criticized regardless of their response.232 They are either criticized for
missing visitation or for missing work, precisely the complaints received in
this study.233
The fact that Florida's problems exist so prevalently elsewhere, and
have done so for so long, suggest that the problems must continue. It does
suggest that some reform is still necessary. Reform of a type which may not
have been tried elsewhere. Perhaps fortunately for Florida's children, the
dependency system is about to be put to a substantial test by the federal
government, with significant incentives for improvement. Or perhaps there
is more reason than ever to worry.
F. A Looming Moral Crisis Created by the Law
With its extensive problems likely unresolved, in 2001 Florida's de-
pendency system will be audited by the federal government relative to its
participation in Social Security Act funding of foster care. Approximately
twenty-eight percent of the state's child welfare budget will be at stake.
Among other things, the audit will assess whether court reviews and perma-
nency hearings are occurring timely, whether expedited termination of
parental rights is pursued when warranted, and whether adoptions occur
timely.34 Excepting the latter item, Florida's performance appears below
standards. 235 If Florida fails to meet ASFA requirements in more than ten
230. Id. at 7-8.
231. Barbara White Stack, When the Bough Breaks: Beaver County Moves Faster
Than Average to Sever Parents' Legal Rights to Their Children, PnrSBURGH POST-GAzEr-r,
Dec. 13, 1999, at A17.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Secretary Judge Kathleen A. Keamey, Address at the Fourth Annual Dependency
Court Improvement Summit (Aug. 30, 2000).
235. Federal auditors are also expected to be assessing the quality of rehabilitation
services provided to parents and the quality of reunification decisions, emphasizing results
over methods. It is expected that auditors will be examining data on the re-entry into foster
care by children who have been re-united with their parents to ensure that children are not
returned too soon or inappropriately. Address by Taylor, supra note 158. By one measure,
the percentage of children who exit foster care who do not re-enter foster care within twelve
months after protective supervision is terminated, Florida is doing relatively well. The
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percent of its cases, the Department will be placed under a two-year correc-
tive action plan, after which significant sanctions will be levied against its
Title IV-B grant for persisting failures.236  "Substantial conformity" must
ultimately be achieved in ninety-five percent of cases.237
On a case-by-case basis, ASFA presents a significant moral crisis for
state intervention in the lives of children and families. As discussed, state
failures to advance the initial stages of proceedings significantly contributes
to keeping many children in foster care for fifteen of twenty-two consecutive
months, thus implicating federal funding.238 This includes delays in conduct-
ing arraignments, preparing case plans, and providing meaningful and timely
rehabilitative services to birth parents. Where statutory deadlines are hon-
ored, a child's parent should have no less than ten months to take advantage
of rehabilitative services outlined in a case plan. State caused delays are
contributing to parent-child relationships becoming subject to automatic
termination, where the circumstances may not have otherwise warranted that
in the first instance.
Federal law effectively decides that, regardless of whether delayed
litigation is caused by the state or a birth parent, children will not suffer with
delayed permanency. Even if the state fails to provide reunification services
in the first fifteen months of the case, it is effectively relieved of providing
such services because it must pursue termination of parental rights at that
time.239 The plan to achieve permanent placement for the child is to prevail
statewide average for the past two fiscal years has maintained a steady 95%, an improvement
from 89% in fiscal year 1995/1996. FLA. DEP'T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES, FY 96/97
PERFORMANCE REPORT ii (Dec. 1997), available at http://www5.myfloridacomlcf_web/
myfloridalhealthfamily/publicationslbureaus/dcf/docslannual.pdf; FLA. DEP'T OF CHILDREN &
FAMILIES, supra note 134, at FSP-026; FLA. DEP'T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES, supra note 3, at
FSP-026.
236. Address by Taylor, supra note 158; U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERvs.,
supra note 162, at ch. 7 § B, F. As discussed above, individual cases can also lose Title IV-E
funding eligibility.
237. Id. at ch. 6 § A-3, A-4.
238. As noted, Florida law actually imposes a more stringent requirement, that termina-
tions be sought once a child has been in foster care for twelve months if parents have not
substantially complied with case plan requirements. FLA. STAT. § 39.806(1)(e) (2000).
239. AACWA has also been criticized for promoting placement of children in out-of-
home care by providing open-ended funding for foster care, while funding for rehabilitative
and preventative services are limited. There is no indication that the scheme adopted by
ASFA remedied this problem because the state is effectively relieved of its rehabilitative
obligation once a child has been in foster care for fifteen of twenty-two consecutive months,
even if delays are caused by the state. See Roger J.R. Levesque, The Failures of Foster Care
Reform: Revolutionizing the Most Radical Blueprint, 6 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 19
(1994-1995).
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over continuation of "reasonable efforts" towards reunification.2A Federal
law presumes that the state will responsibly pursue cases, with any delay
caused by birth parents themselves, leaving them responsible for whether
their families reunify or are destroyed. Given these standards, the arrival of
federal auditors to Florida can create significant pressure to compromise
familial and child interests in order to maintain federal funding." The
pressure to make the wrong and arguably immoral choices has been sug-
gested by other commentators:
Through [ASFA], Congress now wants federal and local officials
responsible for oversight of the nation's foster care population to
concentrate primarily on reducing the time children spend in foster
care. This focus will divert attention from both the prevention of
foster care and the devotion of money and services to reunification
efforts. Instead, new federal policy will encourage adoptions once
children have been in foster care for a certain length of time, even
in cases where there was no compelling need for foster care
placement or where no efforts were undertaken to reunify children
with their birth families.
42
In order to prevail in the face of the moral dilemma created by ASFA,
and embrace its invitation to honor family integrity without sacrificing child
safety, efficacy at the case level must be addressed and assured, precisely
because that is where success or failure for a child and a family is and must
be made.
240. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(C) (Supp. IV 1998).
241. Federal authorities will assuredly be cognizant of ASFAs intent to reduce the
number of children in foster care and the length of stay in foster care. See NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 1998 STATE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO THE ADOPTION
AND SAFE FAMILIES ACT OF 1997, 24 STATE LEGISLATIVE REPORT 5 (Mar. 1999), available at
http://www.ncsl.orgprograms/cyf/asfaslr.htm. For this reason, latitude given to states as to
these ultimate performance measures will likely be limited. Federal auditors affirmatively
indicate an intent "to use a new, results-oriented approach to monitor states' child welfare
programs, including compliance with ASFA amendments." U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFICE, supra note 19, at 16. Moreover, these auditors indicate an intent to depart from tradi-
tional evaluations of "the accuracy and completeness of case files," in favor of evaluating
compliance with "required legal processes and protections" which impact on child perma-
nency and safety. Id.
242. Martin Guggenheim, The Foster Care Dilemma and What To Do About It: Is the
Problem That Too Many Children Are Not Being Adopted Out of Foster Care or That Too
Many Children Are Entering Foster Care?, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 141, 144 (1999). Mr.
Guggenheim's discussion of the adverse impact that these circumstances will have on the poor
and minorities, who are overrepresented in the foster care system, warrants serious considera-
tion. Id. at 145-46.
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VII. PART In-TAMING THE HYDRA-HOW TO ENSURE
CASE-BY-CASE EFFICACY
A. Two Heads Are Not Better Than One
"The Department is like a hydra, with many heads, each not knowing
what the other is doing," commented a widely respected general master
interviewed for this study.243 His remark aptly describes the multiplicity of
roles that the Department is expected to fulfill in each dependency case and
the difficulty attendant with that task. The inherent conflict between the
missions of caring for families and of investigating and prosecuting parents is
recognized by federal authorities, who state:
Caseworkers must balance the often conflicting roles of investiga-
tor and social worker. As investigators, [child protective services]
caseworkers collect evidence and work with law enforcement offi-
cials; as social workers, they work with families to identify ser-
vices needed to improve conditions in the home and provide a safe
environment for the child. 244
In a similar manner, the National Association of Child Advocates finds
this to be the case in the "traditional" child protective services model.245 The
Association describes the traditional role of child protective services to be
"semi-prosecutorial," !ven the role of fact-finding to support legal findings
of abuse and neglect.' Assigning the task of providing or coordinating
rehabilitative services with this prosecutorial role makes it "difficult to
achieve the necessary trust between families and the [child protective ser-
vices] agency worker" and interferes with open communication necessary for
provision of successful services.24'
Following the traditional child welfare model, Florida law provides for
termination of parental rights if a parent fails to comply substantially with a
case plan, while also providing that the Department is primarily responsible
for preparing the case plan and assisting the parent in pursuing case plan
243. Interview with Nicholas Lopane, General Master, Fla. 17th Judicial Circuit, in Ft.
Lauderdale, Fla. (Aug. 7, 2000) (notes on file with author). Several child welfare officials
interviewed in the Circuit provided unsolicited and very high praise for General Master
Lopane's performance in the dependency division.
244. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 224, at 3.
245. HErrzi EPSTEIN, NAT'L Assoc. OF CHD ADvOcATEs, A CHILD ADvocATE's GUIDE
TO STATE CHILD PRoTEcTIvE SERvicEs REFoRM 1 (Winter 1999).
246. Id. at 3.
247. Id. at 6.
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requirements. These are roles which, in order to succeed, require trust and
cooperation between the Department and the parent. The ethics and wisdom
are suspect of also requiring the Department in many cases to simultaneously
develop evidence to prove that the parent has failed to pursue case plan
requirements. It would seem that this arrangement would be analogous to, in
criminal matters, asking the prosecutor to try to rehabilitate the accused
while pursuing prosecution, and expecting trust to develop between the
prosecutor and the accused. Clearly, the prosecutor could only pursue one of
these roles in good faith at a time. The accused is only going to develop
limited, if any, trust for the person who may ultimately seek to prose-
cute. Given that the Department's participation in the case plan is at least
intended to protect a child's interests in family integrity, the arrangement
also calls into question whether the child's interests will be appropriately
protected in every case.
These observations are not merely academic. One caseworker inter-
viewed for this study reported that the impact of this dual role was for fami-
lies in need of help to become simply "defensive," a view shared by many
child welfare professionals who note that parents often mistrust caseworkers
for this reason.m Anger regularly develops between parents and DCF
caseworkers relative to testimony over case plan progress, rising to the level
of shouting in courtrooms. 249
Concern exists that in cases where the Department believes that birth
parents will ultimately fail to rehabilitate themselves and achieve reunifica-
tion, lackluster assistance is provided to the birth parents in accomplishing
the requirements of their case plan; in short, the Department displays limited
interest in rehabilitation when its attention shifts to proving a case for termi-
nation of parental rights.250 Confirmation of this concern is found in reports
of Department caseworkers in another recent study. These workers objected
both to judges and parents' attorneys who sought to maintain family reunifi-
cation as a goal until the parent "proved" they were unable to achieve case
goals, particularly where the caseworker's assessment was that the parents
were "unlikely" to rehabilitate themselves into safe parents for their chil-
dren.25
1
When the Department fails to provide appropriate support and services
for a birth parent to achieve reunification, a birth parent can receive addi-
248. Confidential Interview with DCF case counselor in Broward County (Sept. 29,
2000) (notes on file with author); Fourth Annual Dependency Court Improvement Summit,
Case Conferencing workshop, supra note 1; Confidential Interview, supra note 4.
249. Interview with Lopane, supra note 243; Fourth Annual Dependency Court
Improvement Summit, Lawyers in the Courtroom workshop, supra note 1.
250. Interview with Vilchez, supra note 1; Confidential Interview of September 29,
2000, supra note 248.
251. BARRr, supra note 5, at23.
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tional time to pursue reunification services. This is consistent with state law
and Florida's state plan for Title IV-E funding, which acknowledges that
case-by-case eligibility is contingent on a judicial determination that reason-
able efforts are made by the Department (as the agency responsible for
implementing the plan) to, at the least, make it possible for a child to return
home if not stay there in the first instance.2 2 Knowing that its failure to
demonstrate this to the Court compromises funding provides a strong disin-
centive for the DCF to bring to the court's attention that it has failed to
provide such services timely, despite the detriment to the child. Likewise, a
particular case worker may risk employment-related sanctions. This study,
in viewing a typical day in Florida's child welfare system, saw multiple cases
with significant case plan delays and other actions contrary to a child's best
interests, such as providing for parental visitation, none of which were
reaching the court's attention on a timely basis. In many cases, the simple
passing of time can be contrary to the child's best interest or, at the least,
contrary to the child's interests in maintaining family integrity, particularly in
light of federal law pressures.
Even in cases where services are provided timely under a case plan,
undue litigation delay may very well result nonetheless from the melding of
the caretaking role and the prosecutorial role within the Department. Confu-
sion and lack of resolve would be expected. One child welfare professional
interviewed for this study emphatically attributed delayed cases resulting
from neither the courts nor the DCF having "the guts" to proceed to termina-
tion of parental rights. 2 3 A similar perception is that case workers are slow
to advance cases and make decisions due to a generalized fear of making
wrong decisions. 4 Likewise, many find "confusion" in the roles of Depart-
ment attorneys given the fact that the Department is the client, but the real
party in interest is a child2~5 As one caseworker described it, "our interest is
the child's. '' 256 Despite the Department's mission to safeguard the child's
interests in family integrity, the same caseworker described parents' attor-
neys as being "on the family's side."5
7
The inherent conflict of missions between reunification and prosecution
can be aggravated when case counselors and their supervisors disagree as to
252. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERvs., STATE PLAN FOR TITLE IV-E OF THE
SOCIAL SECURrrY ACT, FOSTER CARE AND ADOPTION ASSISTANCE, STATE OF FLORIDA § 2, at 1
(1998) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 472(a)(1); FLA. STAT. §§ 39.395, .401-02, .501-08).
253. Telephone Interview with Peter Ballisaris, co-chair, Broward Child Welfare
Initiative (Aug. 3, 2000) (notes on file with author).
254. Confidential Interview, supra note 4.
255. Id.; Fourth Annual Dependency Court Improvement Summit, Lawyers in the
Courtroom workshop, supra note 1.
256. Confidential Interview, supra note 248.
257. Id.
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whether termination of parental rights should be pursued. Department
employees report cases where a case counselor and a supervisor disagree on
what is best for the child, leaving the case counselor in conflict over court
testimony on the best interests of a child. 58 In these cases, while the case-
worker would have an obligation to provide accurate testimony to the court
as to observations and facts supporting one position, the caseworker would at
the same time be acting contrary to the will and direction of a supervisor.
The position of the caseworker would seem to be untenable, especially given
personal concerns for performance evaluations, career references, and the
like. The best interests of the child would seem to be left hanging in the
balance.
The conflict of missions imposed by statute on the Department has not
escaped the attention of Florida courts. The Third District Court of Appeal
commented that, "there are instances in which the best interests of the child
and the [Department] may differ."5 9 The First District Court of Appeal
expounded further:
In keeping with the welfare and best interests of the child or chil-
dren being the dominant or controlling consideration in all custody
proceedings we may not overlook the probabilities that instances
may occur wherein the best interests of the child and of the agency
may be divergent. Indeed, in the case sub judice, one of the agents
of the Division of Family Services testified that there were agency
fears that their foster home or shelter would be lost if the agency
insisted that the five children remain there together. We recognize
the validity of the agency's concern for the loss of a facility but
that fear, though a legitimate interest of the agency, may not be
permitted to interfere with the best interests of the subject chil-
dren.m°
The court's observations underscore the fallibility of a system which
requires the service provider role to be responsible for proving that service
provision failed. The statutory assumption that the Department will always
act in accord with the best interests of children is likewise invalidated. The
National Court Appointed Special Advocations Association similarly ac-
knowledges that the interests of children during dependency litigation may
not only be adverse to their parents, but also adverse to the state, thus giving
258. Fourth Annual Dependency Court Improvement Summit, Lawyers in the Court-
room workshop, supra note 1.
259. Simms v. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs. 641 So. 2d 957, 962 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1994).
260. Div. of Family Servs. v. State, 319 So. 2d 72, 77 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
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rise to the need for independent representation. 261 Notably, the primary
advocate for including a guardian for a child as a federal law mandate has
proposed a broad role for the guardian to include both legal and nonlegal
matters. 2
Other comments note how a child's best interests may be compromised
by the conflict of interest that may arise when the governmental agency
charged with providing reunification services is the same agency empowered
to petition for termination of parental rights. One argues that use of private
sector agency case petitioners would relieve the conflict:
The burden is on the public child welfare agency to provide ser-
vices, but it is often the private agency that is actually delivering
services and in frequent contact with the family. When the private
agency is allowed to petition for termination, in effect it acts to re-
lease the public agency from the responsibility of providing further
reunification services.... Allowing the private provider, not just
the public agency, to make this petition avoids resource conflicts
for the public agency and helps to insure that the petition is in the
individual child's best interest.26
3
Above all else, these perspectives underscore the untenable position that
the Department is placed in by the multiplicity of missions and roles assigned
to it by statute. It would stand to reason that by removing from the Depart-
ment its "prosecutorial" role, the Department ought to be better positioned to
stay focused on the mission of simply helping families achieve case plan
goals and developing services for them, the mission it is uniquely equipped
to fill. Likewise, by removing the Department's prosecutorial mission,
parents will more likely develop trusting relationships with the Department
that are necessary for successfully rehabilitating parents in a timely manner,
as well as helping children. This can only serve to improve the safety and
stability of dependent children and provide for the best possible protection
for their interest in family integrity as well as permanency. Concluding that
the Department ought to be relieved of its prosecutorial role in dependency
cases necessarily gives rise to the question of where else that role ought to be
reposited.z64 It is submitted that it can be reposited with counsel for children
261. Rebecca Heartz, Guardians Ad Litem in Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings:
Clarifying the Roles to Improve Effectiveness, 27 FAM. L.Q. 327, 330 (1993).
262. Id. at 331.
263. Mangold, supra note 115, at 1447.
264. This report is not the first to recommend that a person other than a representative
of the Department be the primary moving party in dependency litigation. See generally Albert
E. Hartmann, Crafting an Advocate for a Child: In Support of Legislation Redefining the Role
596 [Vol. 25:547
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who, in addition to helping resolve the problems of conflicting missions for
the DCF, would provide other benefits to children in dependency litigation.
B. Counsel for Children
Child welfare professionals working in jurisdictions where children
have attorneys report a positive impact on case progress. One highly placed
child welfare professional reported in this study that counsel for children
"yield a more vigorous case process" and help ensure that the parties are on
equal footing.265 In accord, the American Bar Association ("ABA") took the
opportunity when promulgating its proposed standards for lawyers represent-
ing children in dependency cases, to express a belief that "all children subject
to court proceedings involving allegations of child abuse and neglect should
have legal representation.",266 Some forty states require that children who are
the subject of dependency actions be represented by an attorney. Of those,
approximately thirty provide for an attorney who attempts to jointly represent
the best interests and the wishes or express interests of the child, while the
remaining ten states keep these functions split between an attorney to repre-
sent the child's wishes and a guardian to represent the child's best inter-
ests.2 7
Where adequately funded and provided sufficient direction as to duties,
counsel for children promotes the interests of children in prompt case pro-
gress. Efforts in Utah demonstrate this point. In a study of efforts to provide
counsel for children in Utah (termed "attorney guardian ad litems") it was
found that use of privately contracted attorneys, who split their professional
energies with more lucrative private practices, "had strong incentives to do as
little work as possible on their dependency cases, for which they were paid
almost nothing."2 8 The pay was approximately $120 per case at best.29 The
role of the attorney was also vaguely defined.2 0 Needed legislative reforms,
which were implemented, included funding to train children's attorneys and
of the Guardian Ad Litem in Michigan Child Abuse and Neglect Cases, 31 U. MicH. J.L.
REFORM. 237 (1997).
265. Telephone Interview with Peter Digre, formerly Deputy Secretary of Operations
for the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitation Services, DCF's predecessor, Los
Angeles County child welfare services agency (Aug. 25, 2000).
266. AMEmCAN BAR ASS'N, supra note 130, at Preface.
267. DUQUETTEET AL, supra note 5, at ch. 7, § 11.
268. Pat McElroy, New Guardian Ad Litem System Key to Utah Child Welfare Reform
XVYoUTH LAW NEws 3, 5 (Sept./Oct. 1994), available at http://www.youthlaw.org/ advocacy
.htm.
269. Id. at 2.
270. Id.
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increased funding to adequate levels for compensation and expenses of
representation.
Clarification of the attorney's role was also critical. Among other
things, Utah law directs the attorney to independently investigate and inform
the court where services are not being provided to a child or the child's
family, assess options of residential placement, when parents are not using
court-ordered services or where services are not working as expected, and
where the agency fails in its duties, including holding statutorily-required
administrative reviews and hearings. Of particular interest, Utah law
requires the child's attorney to notify the court of "any violation of orders,
new developments, or changes.., that justify a review of the case."2 2 With
these reforms in place in 1998, Utah markedly achieved more timely perma-
nency for foster children than Florida achieved. In reunification cases, the
average length of stay in foster care was only 9.7 months.273 Adoption cases
saw children in foster care an average of 27.8 months. 274 The average length
of stay in "permanent foster" homes, as a case goal, was thirty-four
months.2 75 A permanency decision was achieved in twelve months in ninety-
three percent of cases, forty-three percent were assigned a permanency goal
and parental rights were terminated in fifty-one percent in twelve months. 2
76
By January 1999, only twenty-six percent of Utah's foster children lacked a
permanency goal after six months in care.277 Of foster children under the age
of six, permanency goals were lacking after six months for only three of
them-not three percent-three children.278 Moreover, the average time to
close a case with a successful adoption after termination of parental rights
was less than thirteen months in the fiscal year 1997 and less than ten months
in the fiscal year 1998.279
It would seem that counsel for children can help ensure that children's
legal interests do not fall victim to the litigation interests of other parties,
particularly as to delays in the progress of litigation which may only be in the
interests of the child welfare agency or birth parents, several examples of
which were seen during this study. However, it would seem that the child
welfare agency must not be the one to represent the child's legal interests or
even to execute the interests of the state in protecting the welfare of children.
271. Id. at 4; UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-912(3)(x) (1996 & Lexis Supp. 1990).
272. § 78-3a-912(3)(x)(v).
273. See infra note 275.
274. See id.
275. UTAH Div. OF CHLDREN & FAMILY SERvS., STATE OF UTAH, DIvIsION OF CHILD
AND FAMILY SERvIcEs OuTcOME MEASURES REPORT, 1998 11 (Jan 15, 1999).
276. Id. at 21.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 23.
279. Id. at 24.
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The Supreme Court of Florida, for example, has recognized that any agency
or person may do so, stating that "a petition for termination of parental rights
is not a criminal prosecution which must be brought and prosecuted by the
state.... It is a civil action initiated to protect the rights of abused, neglected
or abandoned children. 280
Observations and reports received in this study reveal that reliance on
the Department and its attorneys to protect a child's legal interests is simply
not working. Communication between Department caseworkers and their
legal representatives is extremely poor in many areas of the state, causing
information to simply not be available for the court.2' Regularly, casework-
ers and Department attorneys communicate for the first time only shortly
before a hearing or during the hearing itself. One caseworker reported that in
four years with the DCF, the earliest consultation he had with a Department
attorney was in the court hallway right before a hearing and that regularly
"we go into hearings with no consultation with" Department attorneys. He
also reported being threatened with a contempt of court charge because he
failed to attend three hearings, each time because Department lawyers failed
to provide advance notice of the hearing. Ironically, this caseworker reported
that communication with parents' attorneys was reported to be "very
good."' , 2 Likewise, Department attorneys do not follow up with caseworkers
or supervisors to ensure that court orders are followed, nor do caseworkers
believe their written reports are read by the attorneys.
U 3
Accepting that counsel for a child can be expected to provide better
protection for the child's legal interests, and that a state's child welfare
agency need not represent the legal interests of the state in dependency
litigation, the issue of whether a child's attorney can act in a manner consis-
tent with the child's legal interests while also ensuring that the state's interest
in protecting the welfare of the child is not compromised ought to be ad-
dressed. This would seem possible for two reasons. Most importantly, the
child's best interests ought not be different from the interests desired by the
state in dependency litigation. Any information that the state acquires
through its child welfare agency about the-progress or condition of the parties
can still be conveyed to the court for due consideration, guided by the
agency's counsel, in a fact witness capacity. In addition, any changes made
to the model of legal representation would not change the role of the court as
280. Simms v. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs., 641 So. 2d 957, 961 (1994) (stating
that the guardian ad litem can "exercise[] concurrent power" with the state child welfare
agency "to initiate and litigate" dependency proceedings).
281. Confidential Interviews, supra notes 187, 206, and 248; Interviews with Querry,
and Jones, supra note 1.
282. Confidential Interview, supra note 248.
283. Id.
Dolce
53
Dolce: A Better Day for Children: A Study of Florida's Dependency System
Published by NSUWorks, 2001
Nova Law Review
the state's ultimate representative in adjudicating what is in the best interests
of a child.
As noted, some states provide for counsel to represent a child's best
interests as well as express interests, while others provide for an attorney
simply to represent a child's legal and express interests. A review of the
debate over which model is more appropriate will help reveal why the latter
model is best suited for supplanting the role of the child welfare agency as
the primary moving party in dependency litigation, while ensuring that a
child's legal interests and best interests are duly protected. The debate
necessarily begins with an assessment of whether a single attorney can
represent both the child in the traditional sense of representing a client's
wishes and representing the child's best interests.
Many opine that the roles are incompatible, giving rise to serious confu-
sion and ethical dilemmas. 84 The ABA likewise takes the position, in its
standards for legal representation of dependent children, that the role of
representing a child's best interests as a guardian ad litem and as a traditional
attorney for a child will not be compatible in many cases. The ABA ob-
serves that:
A lawyer appointed as guardian ad litem is almost inevitably ex-
pected to perform legal functions on behalf of the child.... [I]n
many states, a guardian ad litem may be required by statute or cus-
tom to perform specific tasks, such as submitting a report or testi-
fying as a fact or expert witness. These tasks are not part of func-
tioning as a "lawyer. '
285
For these reasons, the ABA recommends appointment of a separate
guardian when the child expresses a wish which is not simply contrary to the
attorney's view of the child's best interest, but potentially "seriously injuri-
ous to the child.
2 86
While these concerns exist, note that the attorneys representing the
Department have for years been effectively conducting litigation regarding
childrens' best interests under the auspices of representing the Department,
though at best representing the Department's point of view of the child's best
interest. This is because the Department is the client. Where the Depart-
ment's interests are contrary to the child's best interests, the responsibility to
ensure the child's best interests are upheld has fallen to the courts. This
reliance is misplaced. As specific cases revealed in this study demonstrate,
much damage can be done to a child while information is either not brought
284. Hartmann, supra note 264, at 238.
285. AMERICAN BAR AsS'N, supra note 130, at pt. I, § A-2.
286. Id. at B-4(3).
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to the court's attention or simply escapes its attention for a protracted period
of time. This condition is aggravated by operation of certain child welfare
laws, particularly laws mandating that time frames be met notwithstanding
the state's failures to perform reasonable efforts to protect a child's interests
in family integrity and rehabilitation.
Counsel for a child, assigned solely to protect their legal interests, can
be an effective mechanism to ensure that matters are brought timely to the
court's attention. Under this model, litigation can be advanced without
decisions being compromised by agency interests which are contrary to a
child's best interests. Unlike agency attorneys responsible for the agency as
their client, a child's attorney remains accountable to the child, ethically and
otherwise, particularly where litigation must be advanced in accord with the
child's legal interests. Nonetheless, it is important that the Department
maintain counsel to present to the court its professional recommendations
and perspectives, and information held as a fact witness.2 7 A child's legal
interests are defined by the ABA as follows:
The determination of the child's legal interests should be based on
objective criteria as set forth in the law that are related to the pur-
poses of the proceedings. The criteria should address the child's
specific needs and preferences, the goal of expeditious resolution
of the case so the child can remain or return home or be placed in a
safe, nurturing, and permanent environment, and the use of the
least restrictive or detrimental alternatives available.
288
In practice, it would also seem possible for representation of dependent
children to proceed in accord with the lawyer's assessment of the child's
"best interests," subject to objective presentation of all pertinent evidence for
the court's determination of the child's best interests, an approach consistent
with representing a child's legal interests. 289 For children old enough to have
some appreciation of what their interests or wishes might be, an attorney
representing the legal interests of a child can advocate for the wishes of the
child, while also executing statutory responsibilities for ensuring that the
legal rights of the child are met.29 As the ABA points out, where this role
287. Consistent with this point of view, see DUQUErTE ET AL., supra note 5, at ch. 7
§ 8.
288. AMBIUCAN BAR ASS'N, supra note 130, at pt. I, § B-5.
289. Mangold, supra note 115, at 1452.
290. One must be cautious to consider the motivations of the child and the capacity of
the child to appreciate why they may choose a particular viewpoint, even as to wishing to
remain silent. Commentators have observed: "
From a developmental perspective, children's cognitive perception of the
world is quite egocentric until age eight or so. The child sees self as the cen-
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may become problematic, a guardian ad litem can be effective in achieving
resolution.
At present, Florida law relies upon volunteer guardians ad litem to
represent the best interests of children in essentially all dependency litiga-
tion. Representing a child in this manner satisfies federal law, which re-
quires only that a nonlawyer guardian ad litem or court appointed special
advocate be appointed to represent the child in every abuse or neglect
case. The guardian is supposed to obtain first hand knowledge of the perti-
nent facts to assess and advise the court of a child's best interests, but need
not address a child's legal interests and may very well not be legally compe-
tent to do so.291 In practice, the guardian program is often assigned to cases
for which it lacks an actual embodied guardian. In addition to first hand
reports received in this study, the Florida House of Representatives Commit-
tee on Children and Families cites to "unofficial reports" that as many as fifty
percent of foster children do not have guardians ad litem appointed to repre-
sent their interests. 292 In the limited instances where attorneys ad litem are
appointed, the statutes lack even a definition of "attorney ad litem," and lack
any further direction on the role or expectations of the attorney.293 In many
cases, an appointed volunteer guardian ad litem will only visit a child a few
times, perhaps even just once, during the course of a case.294
The guardian ad litem program itself recognizes that its role is not
primarily to safeguard the legal interests of a child. As indicated in a memo-
randum of law filed by the guardian ad litem program in one dependency
case, the program only sends one of its attorneys to dependency hearings
with the volunteer lay guardian if it anticipates that legal arguments will have
to be advanced or the program is affirmatively seeking relief through a
motion to execute its role in the case.295 The guardian program observed that
"the legislature has entrusted the Court with ensuring that the legal rights of
ter and cause of all that happens, which-when traumatic events such as se-
vere sexual and physical abuse are occurring, being removed from one's
home, etc.-is terrifying. Telling the child to take on even more responsibil-
ity and "direct" his or her adult attorney may be overwhelming and traumatic
for the child and exacerbate feelings of blame.
DuQuErra ET AL., supra note 5, at ch. 7, § 14.
291. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(A)(ix) (Supp. IV 1998).
292. FLA. H.R. COMM. ON CRiLDENAND FAmILaIs, HB 2125, 13 (May 24, 2000).
293. Id. at 14.
294. Interview with Judge Frusciante, supra note 123.
295. See Amended Memorandum of Law in Support of Shelter Review Hearings, § V,
In re Minor Children (17th Cir. Filed April 5, 2000) (No. 99-770-DP) (on file with au-
thor) The memorandum was supplied by the guardian program with the childrens' identifying
information redacted due to confidentiality in the case.
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children are protected .... ,,296 While one may suggest that the legislature
has otherwise assigned this task to the Department, one must recognize that
in the conduct of litigation the Department may and does have instances
when its interests, or at least its actions, depart from the child's best interests.
Expecting the Department's attorneys to seek out court assistance or even
inform the court of these instances is wholly contrary to the professional
responsibilities of these attorneys to their client, the Department.
291
For these reasons, it is clear that counsel for children would not only
serve different purposes than a guardian ad litem, but may also provide a
basis for more selective appointment of volunteer guardians, particularly to
cases where the child is old enough to express wishes which may be contrary
to the attorney's assessment of the child's best interests. 298 This would allow
for a more readily directed guardian program as a specialized and limited
resource, rather than its widespread assignment in what appears to be a vain
attempt to provide all children with some degree of independent representa-
tion through the guardian ad litem program.
For an additional reason, the guardian ad litem function would still be
necessary in some cases. Having an attorney represent the legal interests of
children cannot be assured to provide for the best interests of the children, for
example, where an abuse victim wishes to return to an abusive home. The
express wish to return would still have to be represented by a child's attorney
while representing the child's legal interests and would call into question the
efficacy of best interests advocacy. The converse is true of a guardian ad
litem representing the best interests of children.29
The ABA recommends appointment of counsel for children at the
earliest point, including upon removal from their home and when the court
obtains jurisdiction.300 To best ensure that the goals of this proposal are
achieved, it is recommended that counsel for children be appointed at the
time of shelter review hearings, at which time the prosecutorial function
would be assumed from the Department. Following this appointment, coun-
sel for children should operate under statutory standards for representation
and duties. The failure to provide specificity has decreased efficacy in other
296. Id. § VII.
297. There should be no doubt that the Department itself, not a dependent child, is the
client recognized by Department attorneys, even when the attorney is employed and housed
outside of the Department itself. See Letter from Patrice Paldino, Assistant Attorney General
(Apr. 25, 2000) (on file with author).
298. See also AvmlcAN BAR Ass'N, supra note 130, at pt. I, § B-4(1) (wherein the
A.B.A. recommended that attorneys for children seek a separate guardian ad litem where a
child is unable to express a position or appreciate the proceedings, such as with younger and
preverbal children).
299. See generally McElroy, supra note 268.
300. AMERIcAN BAR Ass'N, supra note 130, at pt. II, § H-I, commentary.
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jurisdictions, such as Utah prior to recent statutory changes, as discussed
above.
State laws typically do not, but perhaps should, adopt standards for
lawyers who represent children in dependency cases. 30' The ABA developed
nonbinding model standards.30 2 It is reported that these standards "have
become de facto standards of practice" for lawyers representing chil-
dren. 30 3 A similar need for clear standards for attorneys representing child
welfare agencies is expressed as follows:
Ambiguity of role and lack of clear practice standards is not only a
problem for lawyers representing children, it is also a challenge for
attorneys who represent parents or the child welfare agency. Na-
tional standards for legal representation of the child welfare agency
and of parents accused of child maltreatment are not currently
available, but their development may be very important to improve
professional practices.304
Notwithstanding these cautions, in 2000, the Florida Legislature created
an attorney ad litem pilot program (hereinafter "the Program") to provide
attorneys for some children in out-of-home care without articulating such
standards. The Program is established by the Office of State Courts Admin-
istrator either a private or public entity, independent of any other agency
responsible for the care of the dependent children. 30 5 In part, the program
aspires to reduce the length of time children spend in foster care. In cases
where the court determines that attorney ad litem representation is necessary,
the Program is appointed at the shelter hearing, though the court may appoint
the Program later if the need arises. 30 7 Once appointed, the attorney ad litem
represents "the child's wishes.., as long as the child's wishes are consistent
with the safety and well being of the child.' 308 The role of the attorney in
representing the child is consistent with those representing an adult client.309
Beyond this statutory direction, the "duties, responsibilities, and con-
duct" of attorneys in the Program are left to the courts to establish by rule.310
301. Duquette et al., supra note 5, at 122-23.
302. Id. at 123.
303. See FLA. H.R. COMM. ON CHiLDREN AND FAMILIES, HB 2125, 15 n.1 (May 24,
2000).
304. Duquette et al., supra note 5, at 123.
305. FLA. STAT. § 39.4086(2)(b) (2000).
306. See id.
307. § 39.4086(2)(f).
308. § 39.4086(2)(g).
309. Id.
310. § 39.4086(3).
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While perhaps practical for attorneys simply representing the child's express
wishes, such an approach would be ill-advised for the proposal for counsel
for children made in this report, particularly due to the proposed responsibil-
ity for progress of the litigation. Statutory standards ought to specify what
legal interests of children ought to be protected, as suggested by the ABA.
For example, it would seem that representing the child's legal interests ought
to include many of the matters set forth in the Utah model, particularly as to
timely progress of litigation, receipt of appropriate foster care services for
children in out-of-home care, parental access to rehabilitative services, and
regular visitation if reunification is a case plan goal. The ABA identifies
several other litigation-related duties, including conducting independent
investigation and discovery, maintaining contact with other litigants and
representatives, requesting services for the child and parents, and negotiating
settlements.
311
Given the need for independence, as well as the value of specialized
representation, it is recommended that counsel for children be primarily pro-
vided through a discreet independent office, similar to the Program already
established by the Florida Legislature. Another model of publicly-sponsored
representation established in Florida presents a similar and successful ap-
proach, that being providing appellate legal representation of criminallyconvctedersos sntened t ca312
convicted persons sentenced to capital punishment. This model, termed
"capital collateral regional counsels," provides for fiscal control in the pub-
lic's interest, as well as quality control to ensure efficient and timely repre-
sentation, and independence of the office.313
A significant advantage of this proposed model of representation is the
ability of dependency proceedings to be "self-executing," that is requiring
less frequent judicial intervention. Existing law calls for such a multitude of
regular hearings to utilize the court to ensure timely case progress. With
counsel for children monitoring a child's circumstances, case plan progress,
compliance with court orders and the like, the need for such regular hearings
should be diminished. Matters requiring court attention would be brought to
its attention by the parties, rather than presuming that the parties must all be
brought to court regularly for inspection.
C. Enough Already-Reducing the Number of Dependency Hearings
A committee of one circuit's dependency court improvement project
attributed to the courts four main reasons contributing to delays in perma-
nency for dependent children. Two reasons pertain to caseload and hearing
311. AMERicAN BAR Ass'N, supra note 130, at pt. I.C.
312. See §§ 27.7001-.708.
313. See §§ 27.7001, .702, .705.
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volume, specifically an "inability to get timely trials [sic] dates" and "piece
meal trial dates. 31  The remaining two reasons cited reveal an attitude or
belief that dependency judges should be, or at least have been directed to be,
responsible for monitoring cases. The cited reasons were, "the Courts are not
always assertive in directing that cases are staffed for permanency when
appropriate (in a timely manner)" and "the Courts are not always assertive in
holding the parents and parties to target dates and time frames to accomplish
tasks."' 15 These viewpoints suggest that the parties themselves ought not be
responsible for their failure to meet time standards, but rather that the judge
is at fault for not checking to make sure deadlines of which all parties are
aware are actually met.
While it is easy to criticize the parties for not accepting responsibility,
the attitudes expressed arguably match those of the statutes. The statutes set
forth a rigorous hearing schedule, including conducting hearings in every
case on average every two weeks for the first three months of the case, and
every fifteen days until an arraignment occurs, all to require the court to
monitor what the parties are doing. As discussed above, the efficacy of this
approach is questionable for a number of reasons. At the least, it seems clear
that the aggressive hearing schedule is certainly not working to reduce
litigation delays, evidenced by the longstanding problem of protracted litiga-
tion delays that dependent children experience despite all the court hearings.
Moreover, it appears that statutory mandates of court hearings may actually
be impeding effective court monitoring of cases. At least one judge and one
DCF supervisory official commented in this study that some cases warrant
more frequent review hearings, while others could go with less frequent
hearings. 316 However, the demands of conducting all statutorily-required
hearings consumes all available court time, preventing courts from exercising
discretion to monitor cases as it sees appropriate.317
Federal law requirements for in-court reviews, as a condition of receipt
of federal funding, are relatively modest, numbering no more than three a
year and tied to necessary substantive steps. Case plans must be prepared
within sixty days of a child's removal from the home to detail the efforts and
services which will be expended to attempt to achieve safe conditions for
reunification, unless reunification is not appropriate, in which case perma-
nent homes must be sought within thirty days of the determination that
reunification will not be pursued. Within twelve months of removal, and
314. Fla. 17th Judicial Circuit Dependency Court Improvement Program, Children's
Services Comm., supra note 159.
315. Id.
316. Interview with Judge Frusciante, supra note 123; Interview with Lori I. Day,
Service Center Director, District 10, Fla. Dep't of Children & Families (Sept. 29, 2000).
317. Interview with Judge Frusciante, supra note 123.
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every twelve months thereafter if necessary, a permanency hearing must be
held to assess efforts towards permanency and make decisions for perma-
nency, with interim six month reviews to assess the safety and appropriate-
ness of the child's placement. Florida directs all of these hearings and then
adds fifteen day shelter reviews up to the time of case adjudication, almost
tripling federal requirements even in cases where all other deadlines are
achieved. It is submitted that these excess reviews could be safely eliminated
in favor of additional court hearings only as needed in the judgment of the
court and on petition of a party, provided counsel for children is provided to
ensure that the measures can become "self-executing," as discussed above.
D. Shortened Permanency Deadlines for Younger Children
Recognizing the damage that results to children from delayed perma-
nency has contributed significantly to the philosophy of child welfare laws.
For this basic reason, time limits are placed on reunification of families,
failing which, other permanency options must be pursued.318 While recog-
nizing that, especially for younger children, delays in legal status are less
important than the actual commitment of their caretakers, older children
likely confer greater significance to their legal status.3 19 It appears that foster
care nonetheless carries significant pain for children, including the shame
and stigma of being foster children and the pain of family separa-
tion.320 However, damage to children and their parental bonds is exacerbated
with younger children:
Emotionally, and intellectually, an infant or toddler cannot stretch
her waiting more than a few days without feeling overwhelmed by
the absence of her parents.... [Hjer emotional and intellectual
memory has not matured sufficiently to enable her to hold on to the
parent she has "lost." During such an absence, the child under two
years of age "quickly" latches on to the new adult who cares for
the child's needs.321
318. See Marsha Garrison, Parents' Rights vs. Children's Interests: The Case of the
Foster Child, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 371, 377 (1996) (stating that "it is the
child's need for an undisrupted parental relationship in a permanent home that provides the
basis for proposals to sever the parent-child bond at the end of a time-limited period in foster
care")
319. Id. at 388--89.
320. Chaifetz, supra note 2, at 21; Confidential Interview of May 23, 2000, supra note
1; Confidential Interview, supra note 4.
321. McAvay, supra note 141, at 138, (quoting JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN Er AL., THE BEST
INTEREST OF THE CHILD: THE LEAST DETRIMENTAL ALTERNATIVE 42(1996)).
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Not until adolescence does a child's sense of time resemble that of an
adult.322 As to all children, the Department seems to recognize that delays in
permanency do result in "detachment from the parents.",321 One attorney for
children reported that long delays in permanency cause children to "lose
hope and become angry." 32 The National Council of Juvenile and Family
Court Judges provides this succinct statement of the prejudicial passage of
time on children subjected to dependency proceedings:
The passage of time is magnified for children in both anxiety lev-
els and direct effect. Three years is not a terribly long period of
time for an adult. For a six-year-old, it is half a lifetime, for a
three-year-old, it is the formative state for trust and security, and
for a nine-year-old, it can mean the difference between finding an
adoptive family and failing to gain permanence because of age. If
too much time is spent in foster care during these formative years,
lifetime problems can be created.325
Approximately two-thirds of Florida's dependent children are within
these critical, formative years. Twenty-one percent are under the age of two,
nineteen percent are between three and five, and twenty-six percent are
between six and nine years of age.326 The average dependent child in Florida
is just over eight-years-old.327
Three states attempt to address the particular need for permanency for
younger children. Minnesota requires permanency hearings for children
under the age of eight to be held no later than six months after out-of-home
placement, while permitting twelve months for cases involving children over
the age of eight. 2 Similarly, Oklahoma requires a permanency hearing for a
child under three within six months, instead of the usual twelve months.329
322. Id. at 138-39.
323. Interview with Allegretti & Sanford, supra note 7.
324. Confidential Interview, supra note 4.
325. NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES, supra note 116, at
14.
326. FLA. DEP'T CHILDREN & FAMILiS, CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES ANNUAL
STATISTICAL DATA TABLES FISCAL YEAR 1998-99 Table D-5 (July-June), available at
http://www5.myflorida.com/cf-web/myfloridahealthfamily/publications/childrensissues/child
abuse/9899chnt.pdf.
327. OFFICE OF PROGRAM POLICY ANALYSIS AND GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY,
SUBJECTS OF CHILD PROTECTIVE INVESTIGATIONS: SURVEY RESULTS AND CASE CHARACTERIS-
TICS 8 (Report No. 98-26) (1998), available at http://www.oppaga.state.fl.us
/reports/pdf/9826rpt.pdf.
328. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260C.201Subd 11. (West Supp. 2001).
329. OKLA. STAT ANN. tit. 10 § 7003-5.6g (West Supp. 2001).
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Vermont law provides for permanency hearings every six months for child-
ren between the ages of three and six, and every three months for children
under three.33t Florida joins most other states in making no adjustments to
dependency systems of procedures for these younger children.
Given the foregoing, it is recommended that Florida consider shortening
permanency deadlines in cases involving younger children who are in foster
care. However, implementation of such efforts should likely be delayed until
such time as case planning more regularly accords with statutory deadlines
and assurances can be made that rehabilitative services can be promptly
provided. These measures would seem to be necessary to provide due re-
spect for a young child's interest in family integrity while balancing the
uniquely pronounced need for permanency experienced by younger children.
E. Time Out on Continuances
In football games they are called "time outs"--two-minute pauses in the
action so a team can regroup before getting back into the fray. The other side
waits. Under the strict rules, teams get only three for each thirty minute half
of the game. For this reason, time outs are used sparingly and only when
really needed. In child welfare litigation they are called "continuances."
Unlike football, they can be days or weeks or even months long as a party
catches up on delinquent tasks. The other parties wait, including the child.
Unlike football, each party gets as many time outs as the judge is willing to
issue. Use them too early or too often and, well, nothing really happens.
You can always get another, with no accounting required for previous delay.
Significantly, the legislature has specified only the following four
circumstances when continuances may be granted in dependency litiga-
tion: 1) Continuances at the request of, or with the consent of, a child's
counsel or guardian ad litem;331 2) Continuances at the request of the De-
partment's attorney, but only if material evidence is unavailable, due dili-
gence has been exercised to obtain the evidence timely, and it is believed that
the evidence will be available within thirty days, or otherwise under excep-
tional circumstances;332 3) Continuances for "[r]easonable... delay neces-
sary to accomplish notice of the hearing to the child's parents[," though the
Department must "continue regular efforts to provide notice" during such
330. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33 § 5531(a)(2) (Lexis Supp. 1999). These provisions are not
self-executing; they require an order on a party's motion or a sua sponte order.
331. FLA. STAT. § 39.013(10)(a) (2000).
332. § 39.013(10)(b). If the Department will not be prepared in 30 days, the statute
empowers the parent to move for an order to show cause for sanctions, including dismissal of
the case. § 39.013(10)(b)l.
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delay;333 and 4) Continuances for reasonable delay at the request of the birth
parent.
334
Under court rules governing dependency cases, continuances may be
granted simply on a showing of good cause.335 In cases witnessed in this
study, continuances were granted and waiver of time standards were made
typically without the parties addressing the statutory criteria. This included
waiver of statutory time standards in advance of an express or demonstrated
need. It appeared in some instances that judges really had no choice but to
grant continuances grudgingly because certain tasks must be completed for
cases to progress. By placing the interests of parents and the Department
above children's interests in permanency in this manner, the intent of the law
to provide deadlines to ensure that children achieve permanency in their lives
is being frustrated.
The observations made in this study were confirmed by others in re-
ports. For example, a Department employee complained that significant
litigation delays are resulting from multiple rescheduling of the same hear-
ings due to continuance requests and scheduling conflicts.336 A committee of
the dependency court improvement program in one judicial circuit similarly
concluded that attorneys for parents are "getting excessive continuances for
trials, months of delays."3 " Football teams are limited in their time outs so
that the players can go home at a reasonable hour. It would stand to reason
that dependency litigants, especially children, should be assured that they get
a permanent home in a reasonable amount of time.
The foregoing suggests two legislative changes. One is to add a statu-
tory provision that any continuance or waiver of time standards must be
considered individually and not be waived in advance of the particular
circumstances arising which may warrant a continuance. Another is to limit
the parties to a total number of days of continuances which can be sought
during the pendency of litigation, in order to provide an incentive for parties
to limit the number of times delays in litigation are sought. This is intended
to balance the litigation interests of the various parties with the interests of
children in expediency. It is recommended that continuance requests be
limited to sixty days annually.
333. § 39.013(10)(c).
334. § 39.013(10)(d).
335. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.255(f).
336. Interview with Day, supra note 316; Confidential Interview, supra note 4.
337. Fla. 17th Judicial Circuit Dependency Court Improvement Program, Children's
Services Comm., supra note 159.
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F. Simplified Case Planning
As discussed above, case planning is supposed to provide direction on
all key matters in a dependency case, including what services will be pro-
vided to the children and parents, and what expectations are made for efforts
to reunify families or to keep children safely in their homes.338 Case plan
requirements under federal law are rather straightforward and to be applied
for all foster children. 339 To qualify for federal funding under the Social
Security Act, states are to require that case plans address the following four
basic matters: 1) A description of services offered and provided to prevent
removal of the child or to reunify the family, as applicable; 340 2) A descrip-
tion of the type of home or institution where the child will be placed, with a
discussion of safety and appropriateness of the placement;341 3) A plan for
assuring safe and proper care is provided to the child and services provided
to parents for reunification or other permanent placement, and description of
those that have been provided;342 and 4) A plan for necessary services for the
child and foster parents.343
The case plan should also have attached documentation of efforts to
achieve adoption or other permanency and the child's health and education
records.3 " Under special circumstances, the case plan must include: 1) If
pertaining to foster children over sixteen-years of age, a transition plan,
including provisions as to independent living;345 and 2) If a child is to be
placed in a foster family home or institutional placement far from the home
of origin, or is to be placed in an out-of-state foster placement, a statement of
how a child's best interest will be served by that placement and plans for an
annual visit by a caseworker in that state, with a report to the state of ori-
gin.3
46
As with required court reviews, Florida law substantially exceeds
federal case plan requirements for cases involving children in out-of-home
care by including at least the following eleven matters: 1) A description of
the problem being addressed, including that which precipitated the depend-
ency case;347 2) The tasks required of the parent, and the services and treat-
ments to be provided, including the type, frequency, location and accountable
338. § 39.601.
339. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(16) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
340. 45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(g)(4) (2000).
341. 42 U.S.C. § 675(1)(A) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
342. § 675(1)(B).
343. Id.
344. 42 U.S.C. § 675(1)(C), (E) (Supp. IV 1998).
345. § 675(1)(D).
346. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(A)(i)-(ii) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
347. FLA. STAT. § 39.601(2)(a) (2000).
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Department staff person or service provider; 34 3) Performance measures,
including time frame, relative to the services and treatment; 349 4) The child's
permanency goal and type of placement;350 5) The reasonable efforts to be
made to place the child in an adoptive home or legal custodial relationship if
reunification efforts fail, and any concurrent plan to prepare for termination
and reunification; 351 6) The type of home or institution where the child is
placed, as well as a description of its safety and appropriateness, including as
to how it is the least restrictive and most family-like option, and in close
proximity to the child's home;352 7) Ongoing financial obligations, including
health insurance, to be maintained by the parents; 353 8) A description of the
foster parents' or legal guardians' role in providing or developing services
for themselves or the child; 354 9) A description of the child's need for ser-
vices and how they will be implemented;355 10) How the child's educational
placement will remain stable; 56 and 11) Written notice to the parent that
failure to comply substantially with the case plan may result in termination of
parental rights and, somewhat ironically, that a petition to terminate rights
may actually be filed sooner than required by statute based on such fail-
ures.
357
As if the foregoing is not enough, there is an entirely separate require-
ment that the Department describe how it will actually assure that the ser-
vices set forth in the case plan will actually be provided, and how they will
improve the home and facilitate reunification or other permanent placement
with those services. 358 Moreover, a separate description is required of how
the Department will assure that the services described in the case plan will be
provided and will address the child's needs and why all of this is appropriate
in the first place.359 In addition, one case plan requirement suggests the need
for a crystal ball or other such fortune telling device. In the first sixty days of
the case before the court has made any truly final decisions about a child or a
family, the Department is supposed to explain how it "plans to carry out the
judicial determination made by the court, with respect to the child, in accor-
348. § 39.601(2)(b).
349. § 39.601(2)(c).
350. § 39.601(3)(a).
351. Id.
352. § 39.601(3)(b), (e).
353. § 39.601(3)(c).
354. § 39.601(3)(e).
355. Id.
356. § 39.601(3)(0.
357. § 39.601(3)(k).
358. § 39.601(3)(h).
359. § 39.601(3)(i).
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dance with this chapter and applicable federal regulations. ''360 By law, the
case plan needs to be created before any substantial judicial determinations
are actually made at the time of adjudication.
The meticulous case plan requirements under state law give rise to
arguably onerous and confusing case plans. The Department has attempted
to develop a streamlined, standardized form to be used to report all of the
foregoing in a case plan. When completely blank, the form is twenty-eight
pages long.361 As set forth above, the result of the state case plan require-
ments are widely cited among child welfare professionals as promoting
confusing case plans. Moreover, it would seem that the painstaking statutory
detail promotes "cookie cutting" of case plans. The extensive statutory
directives leave little room for case by case determinations of the individual-
ized needs of the parties, detracting from the overriding directive and intent
that case plans be specially tailored and remain flexible to the needs of the
children and families involved.
Case plan requirements in some other states are much simpler than in
Florida. Ohio, for example, simply directs that case plans be standardized
under rules developed by the child welfare agency which comply with con-
tent requirements of Title IV-E of the Social Security Act and the stated
goals under federal laws for funding eligibility.362 Given the foregoing
considerations, it is proposed that Florida replace its detailed case plan
requirements with an approach similar to that taken in Ohio.
VI. PART IV-WHAT WORKS-GUIDANCE FOR FLORIDA
FROM OTHERS' SUCCESS
A. Quit Weighing Pigs and Other Lessons from Alabama
In 1991, the State of Alabama settled a class action lawsuit brought on
behalf of foster children for the impact of similar systemic problems to those
currently experienced in Florida. The consent decree embodying the settle-
ment is credited as being "the first, state-wide, bottom-up reform of a child
welfare system in the United States. 363 It is founded on "reform... driven
not by procedural requirements but by the principles of good practice. ' '3 '
360. § 39.601(3)(g).
361. See Letter with enclosure from Maria B. Leon, Family Safety, Fla. Dep't of
Children & Family Servs. (July 18, 2000) (on file with author).
362. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.412(B)(1) (Anderson Supp. 1998).
363. BAZELON CENTER FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW, MAKING CHLD WELFARE WORK:
How THE R.C. LAwsuIT FORGED NEW PARTNERSHIPS TO PROTECT CHmIDREN AND SUSTAIN
FAMmmS 1 (1998).
364 Id. at 6.
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Results are measured simply by whether the system "is meeting the child's
needs for stability and family integrity, by whatever means it takes.
365
"Bottom-up reform" refers to reform which begins with principles on
how agency social workers are to work with children and families, and what
supports they will need for that interaction, rather than starting with agency
structure from the "top down."366 For example, promoting visitation between
dependent children and their parents is recognized in the Alabama consent
decree as being one of guiding principles for an appropriate "system of
care." Visitation is "viewed as an essential ingredient of family reunification
services.... [to] be actively encouraged" and any necessary transportation
assistance is to be provided.367 Resources needed to support this principle are
then to be put in place.
Alabama's focus on principles and resources, directed essentially from
the child's view, have allowed Alabama, unlike Florida, to enjoy a decrease
in the number of child abuse and neglect reports received each year since
1997 which result in a finding of abuse or neglect or reason to suspect such
maltreatment.368 Similar success is found when measuring the number of
children in out-of-home care, which has fluctuated over the past several
years, but in raw numbers never reaches the levels experienced prior to
1992.369 Given that the Alabama model has been phased in over time among
the counties, as a so-called "conversion" process, Alabama has been able to
measure contemporaneous success of its reform efforts among its coun-
ties. Of particular note is the fact that the rate of children in foster care
(cases per 1000 children) in "converted" counties versus "non-converted"
counties has been lower every year since 1992.370 Moreover, the rate differ-
ence between converted and non-converted counties has steadily widened
virtually every year since 1992.371 Alabama's success has come without any
significant change in the permanency goal for children over the past five
years, with statewide trends remaining relatively constant for all permanency
options. 3
72
From Alabama's experience, the federal court monitor, Dr. Ivor Groves,
concludes that "child safety does not correlate strongly with the number of
children taken into custody ... and, in fact, exposes children to other poten-
365. Id.; see app. 1.
366. Id. at 26-27.
367. Id. at 89.
368. IVOR D. GROVES, A STATUS REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE R. C. v. PETELOS
CONSENT DEcREE 32 (Dec. 1999).
369. Id. at 38.
370. Id. at 40.
371. Id.
372. Id. at 46.
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tial sources of harm., 373 Dr. Groves attributes Alabama's success in foster
care primarily to the strengthening service provision on initial con-
tact. Suggesting support for reducing reliance on court hearings to ensure
compliance and actions in the best interests of children, as this article urges,
Dr. Groves opines that you "cannot monitor into compliance." In a similar,
though more colorful manner, Dr. Groves comments, "you can weigh the pig,
but that can't make it fatter." 374 Resource development is critical to success
and much of Alabama's efforts in this regard have been geared towards
home-based services.375
In part for this reason, this article proposes allowing the DCF to focus
on providing social services without contending with potential conflicts in its
missions, especially for generating a trusting relationship with birth parents
and providing services to protect the interest of children in family integ-
rity. Moreover, providing counsel for children can allow for reduced litiga-
tion, allowing all of the parties to focus on services.
Consistent with the successes in Alabama, the need for "front-end"
services is routinely recognized.376 Compliance with federal ASFA require-
ments is also recognized by the National Conference of State Legislatures to
place urgency on the need to ensure that social services are available:
Even after ASFA, the permanency goal for most children in state
care will be to return home as quickly as possible. States will find
it hard to achieve that goal if appropriate and effective services are
not provided to families in a timely manner. When services are de-
layed, agencies and courts are unable to make informed decisions
about parents' ability to protect and care for their children, and
such children will continue to languish in foster care.3
Dr. Groves opines that Florida is weak in its provision of services
immediately following the child protective investigation, causing more
children to be removed from their families.378 At the least, the finding of this
373. Id.
374. Telephone Interview with Ivor D. Groves, Federal Court Monitor (Aug. 25, 2000)
(notes on file with author).
375. BAZELON CENTER FOR MENTAL H .ALm LAw, supra note 363, at 62-64.
376. See, e.g., Duquette et al., supra note 5, at 96 (stating that "[t]he child welfare
system still focuses its efforts to develop family support services on families who enter the
system by way of child maltreatment reporting mechanisms.... [O]ur social policies activate
the most extensive interventions when we believe that disruption or severing of family ties is
required.")
377. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, STATE LEGIsLATIVE REPORT,
supra note 241.
378. Telephone Interview with Groves, supra note 374.
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study that case plan development is seriously delayed in many cases in itself
prevents Florida's dependency system from providing early services in a
case, as has been successful in Alabama. Likewise, Alabama's model priori-
tizes flexibility in service provision and, therefore, case planning. For this
reason, this article urges simplifying Florida's statutes on case planning.
B. The Partial Promise of Community-Based Care
Efforts are underway in Florida to improve the provision of ser-
vices. With the reorganization of the Department by the legislature in the
2000 legislative session, steps are to be taken to privatize the delivery of
direct child welfare services, with the Department remaining primarily
responsible for "contract management, monitoring compliance with contract
requirements, and assuring fiscal integrity and quality in the service provided
by private entities." 379 This direction follows legislative mandates for the
privatization of the delivery of foster care and related services, commonly
referred to as "community based care," beginning in 1996 with model pro-
grams and then in 1998 with a directive that privatization be implemented
state-wide.3 80 Florida's efforts in this regard accord with methods being tried
nationally to improve overall system performance.38'
The promise of community-based care is to improve service delivery
and availability, which, as seen in Alabama, is the proven method to solving
many of the problems experienced by children and families in the depend-
ency system. Reliance on the implementation of community-based care
initiatives as the sole means to ensure timely permanency and appropriate
care of all foster children and families would be suspect for two reasons.
One, community-based care systems do not have a direct impact on the role
or expectations of the judiciary. Two, the model community-based care
systems implemented over the past four years in Florida have faltered. A
report prepared for the Department reviewed model community-based care
projects that have been implemented in five of the Department's fifteen
districts at various points over the past three years.382 The deficiencies in one
project go to the core of the dependency system mission, the report noting
that the "Department of Children and Families does not have confidence that
the coalition staff can achieve the required levels of safety and permanence
for the children and families being served .... ,3 The oldest program was
found to suffer from at least one significant problem historically experienced
379. FLA. H.R. COMM. ON CHILDREN AND FAMLIs, HB 2125, 9 (May 24, 2000).
380. FLA. STAT. § 409.1671 (2000).
381. MARKOWrrZ, supra note 198, at 13-14.
382. See generally id.
383. Id. at 19.
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by the DCF itself, high staff turnover, as well as "little confidence [among
Department staff] that the [private] provider line staff knew what they were
doing."3
84
The transition to privatization, though not necessarily privatization
itself, presents an interim (though potentially lasting for a number of years)
risk to the provision of needed services for family reunification, children's
needs in foster care, and other such services. A principal source of the
problem lies with compensation methods under the private sector con-
tracts. The Department has observed that an unresolved "risk factor" exists
with some private service contracts, particularly from "unanticipated
caseload increases or an unusual incidence of families with catastrophic
service needs. ' 385 The Department projects that these risk problems can
ultimately be addressed "by moving toward a case-rate funding approach,"
but that will take "experience data" which is not available at this time.386
C. What We Teach Our Children
Public policy and government action are teaching tools for society,
particularly for children, whose appreciation and understanding of the values
and expectations conveyed through laws and governmental acts grow as they
do. Jurisprudential philosopher H.L.A. Hart wrote, "[t]he law of every
modem state shows at a thousand points the influence of both the accepted
social morality and wider moral ideals., 387 In the spirit of Professor Hart's
observations, we know that when the State exercises its parens patriae role
and acts through its dependency system to raise a foster child, its daily
impact inevitably teaches that child. Two years after I adopted my son at age
four from an overseas orphanage, he asked, "why are you my dad?" The
silence of my long pause to grasp for the right answer caused him to ask
further, "because you teach me things?" To this day, I can find no better
answer, but I do find myself awed by the responsibility that his questions
remind me I have. I must be ever vigilant in my actions, because he will be
looking to me to learn, even when I am not trying to teach, and I will make
mistakes.
When our public policy fails to achieve for a foster child a permanent,
stable family over the course of many years, the child may learn that family
is not important to us whether we intend that or not. No child will be reading
legislative intent language to discover otherwise. When we move a child
from one crowded foster home to another every few weeks or months, we
384. Id. at 29.
385. FLA. DEP'T0oFCHILDRM & FAMImS, supra note 177, at 23.
386. Id.
387. H.L.A. HART, THECONCEPrOFLAiw203-04 (2d ed.1961).
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teach that child to have a life of temporary, poorly-developed relation-
ships. When we fail to keep our promises to a child, such as by failing
simply to show up to supervise anxiously awaited visitation with a parent, the
child learns that we, the State, cannot be trusted. Public policy must be
prepared to act timely and responsibly in dependency cases when things go
wrong, because they will. Accomplishing this goal will help ensure that a
child does not learn the wrong things, because on the typical day that we
create for Florida's dependent children, they will learn from their parents,
even the lessons that we do not want to impart.
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